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ABSTRACT
Fifty-four middle school age (sixth to eighth grade)
children took part in a study designed to examine the effects
of situational control and performance feedback on locus of
control orientation.

The subjects took part in a task situa-

tion in which they were asked to read three fictitious experiments and decide from a list of ten results which ones were
actually found in the experiment and which were not.

Pre and

post-task measures were obtained on two locus of control scales.
The Locus of Control Scale For Success - Failure (Epstein and
Komorita, 1971) was answered in direct relation to the task
situation and provided a task specific measure of control
orientation.

The pre-task measure on this scale was obtained

by giving the subjects a sample of the task to examine prior
to the experimental manipulations.
ment Responsibility

Questionnair~

The Intellectual Achieve(IAR)

(Crandall, et. al.,

1965) was used to obtain the subjects' control orientation for
the academic achievement situation.

The pre-testing was done

in large groups and took place at least two weeks prior to the
individual task situation and post-testing.

Subjects were

randomly assigned to one of three instruction groups:

skill

(personal control) oriented, chance (no personal control) oriented, or no control orientation.

Subjects were also randomly

assigned to one of three feedback (falsified) groups:
failure, or no feedback.

success,

This design yielded nine treatment

groups with six subjects in each group.

The hypotheses tested

were (a) The experience of personal control (skill instructions)

would lead to greater intern1l control orientation, while the
experience of no personal control (chance instructions) would
result in greater external control orientation.

(b) Success

feedback would bring about a shift toward a more internal control orientation and failure feedback would result in a greater
external control orientation.

The no control orientation

instructions and the no feedback factors were used as controls
on type of instructions and type of feedback, respectively,
and were not expected to lead to any differential shifting in
control orientation.

No interaction effects were predicted.

The test data were analyzed in a 3 X 3 X 2, mixed effects
analysis of variance, with repeated measures on the pre and posttask locus of control score factor.

Separate analyses were

performed on the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure
and on the r+ subscale, r- subscale, and total I score of the

TAR.

The results did not support the first hypotl1csis.

Perso~~l

control versus no personal control, as manipulated by ski!lchance instructions had no significant effects on locus of
control scores.

The results supported the second hypothesis

fairly clearly Nith the Locus of Control Scale for SuccessFailure but not at all with the IAR.

A significant trials X

feedback interreaction with the Locus of Control Scale for
Success - Failure scores was broken down and indicated that:
(a) The failure and success groups changed differentially.
(b) The failure and no feedback groups changed differentially.
(c) The failure group changed significantly in a more external
direction.

(d) The failure group was significantly more

external than the success group on the post-test, while there
were no significant differences among the three feedback groups
on the pre-test.

The only significant finding with the IAR was

an overall shift towards greater internality on the r- subscale
and the total I score.

Results were discussed in terms of the

generalization and multidimensionality of the locus of control
concept.

A.

INTRODUCTION

The locus of control construct grew out of Rotter's
(1954)

social learning theory.

This theory stresses the inter-

action of four classes of variables:

behaviors, expectancies,

reinforcements, and psychological situations.
formula for behavior according to Rotter (1975)

The basic
is that "the

potential for a behavior to occur in any specific psychological
situation is a function of the expectancy that the behavior will
lead to a particular reinforcement in that situation and the
value of that reinforcement (p. 57) .''

Locus of control refers

specifically to the expectancy aspect of this formula and consists of a continuum dimension from internal to external control
orientation.

The difference between these two orientations is

in terms of the degree to which an individual perceives a reinforcement as being contingent upon his own behavior or his
own relatively permanent characteristics (internal control) and
the degree to which an individual perceives reinforcements as
being contingent upon luck, fate, powerful others, or as being
unpredictable because of the complexity of the forces surrounding
him (external control)

(Rotter, 1966).

Rotter and his students

subsequently developed scales designed to measure the generalized
control expectancies which individuals develop through their
unique history of reinforcements in specific situations (Phares,
1955; James, 1957; Rotter, 1966).
The concept of locus of control as a generalized expectancy
raises questions as to what factors are involved in the development of an individual's locus of control orientation and what
factors contribute to the modification of this orientation once
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it has stabilized.

There has been a wide variety of research

dealing with locus of control since Rotter's initial formulation
of this concept.

Several bibliographies have been published

(Throop and MacDonald, 1971; Prociuk and Lussier, 1975; Thornhill,
Thornhill, and Youngman, 1975) which reflect the growth of this
research area.

A number of reviews of the locus of control

literature have also appeared (Minton, 1967; Lefcourt, 1966,
1972; Rotter, 1966, 1975; Joe, 1971, and Phares, 1978), including two books dealing exclusively with this topic (Lefcourt,
1976; Phares, 1976).

In light of this volume of research dealing

with locus of control, there 'is a surprising paucity of well controlled experimental investigations designed to examine the
factors involved in the development and modification of locus of
contrcl.

Although the evidence is largely correlational or

inferential in nature, two factors have emerged as salient in
the development and modification of locus of control:

personal

control versusnopersonalcontrol and success versus failure.
The purpose of the present investigation is to examine the
effects of these factors in a controlled setting.
Several investigators have studied the relationship between
parental factors such as attitudes, child rearing practices, and
styles of interacting with their children, with their children's
locus of control scores (Chance, 1965; Katkovsky, Crandall,
and Good, 1967; Tolor and Talowiec, 1968; Dav~s and Phares, 1969;
Crandall, 1973).

Taken together these studies point to warmth,

nurturance, support, encouragement, flexibility, consistency,
and pushing towards independence as being important parental
factors involved in developing an internal orientation in the
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child.

These parents allow their children to experience their

own influence over the environment and provide success experiences
for the child's efforts through warmth and approval.

Parental

factors that have been found to relate to externality in the
child such as hostility, rejection, punitiveness, and domination
indicate that children with these types of parents are likely
to be controlled by their parents and experience little success
in terms of being rewarded with parental praise.
Studies comparing locus of control scores of samples of
differing culture, race, and social class also point to the importance of these two factors in the development of locus of
control orientation.

Hsieh, Shybut, and Lotsof (1969)

investi-

gated differences in Rotter's I-E scale scores between samples
of Chinese, Chinese-American, and Anglo-American subjects.

They

hypothesized that the American culture with its emphasis·on
uniqueness, independence, and self-reliance would produce
individuals with a more internal orientation than the Chinese
culture where kinship and status quo are stressed, and luck,
chance, and fate are taken for granted in life.

Their analysis

of the data produced a mean of 8.58 for the Anglo-American group,
9.79 for the American born Chinese, and 12.07 for a group of
Hong Kong born Chinese.

Both the Anglo-American and the Chinese-

American groups were significantly more internal than the
native Chinese group.

Battle and Rotter (1963)

found that the

lower class Black children in their study were significantly
more external than both middle class Blacks and White subjects.
Additionally, the middle class children in general were

------1
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significantly more internal than the lower class children.
The more disadvantaged children

i~

this study were also the

ones that scored in a more external direction on locus of
control.

Battle and Rotter conclude that the perception of

opportunity to obtain the material rewards in a culture seems
to be an important part in developing an internal control
orientation.
(1965)

Similar results were found by Lefcourt and Ladwig

in a population of reformatory inmates.

Blacks again

scored significantly more external than White subjects.

Lefcourt

and Ladwig pointed to the role of segregation and discrimination
in denying Blacks reinforcement despite their individual achievement efforts.

This contention seems to be strengthened by

Kiehlbauch's (1968) failure to find significant differences
between Blacks and Whites on the Rotter I-E scale in a population of reformatory inmates.

Lefcourt (1976) maintains that

since the major difference between these two studies is that
the data were obtained approximately six years apart, the differing results may represent a real change brought about by the
Civil Rights movement.
Jessor, Graves, Hanson, and Jessor (1968) conducted an
extensive field study in a tri-ethnic (Anglo, Indian, and
Spanish-American) Southwestern rural community.

The purpose

of their study was to apply Rotter's social learning theory in
a sociological investigation of deviant behavior.

The oppor-

tunity subjects had to obtain culturally valued goals was
studied through the use of an objective access to opportunity
index which consisted of a series of eight measurements:
marital status, language spoken in the home, occupation,

age,
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education, religion, generation mobility, and social participation.

In their community survey study of 221 persons it was

found that Anglo's

{X =

6.0) had a significantly greater access

to opportunity than both Indians

(X =

3.4).

(X

= 3.B) and Spanish-Americans

This same order appeared for the three groups on a

modified form of Rotter's I-E scale, with both Anglos
and Indians

(X

{X =

6.0)

= 7.0) significantly more internal than the

Spanish-Americans

{X =

10.1).

Of more importance though, was

the finding that objective access and locus of control were
correlated {r

=

.50, p<.001)

indicating that the more ability

to attain valued goals and successfully influence one's environment that an individual has, the more personal control he perceives himself to have.
A wide variety of therapy and training studies have
demonstrated pre to post-treatment shifts in locus of control
toward a more internal orientation.

Although the facLors

bringing about change in these studies arc nebulous, the results
suggest that as a person experiences some success at more ef fective ways of dealing with his life situation through therapy
or training, it is reflected in a shift towards greater internality on locus of control measures.

Smith (1970), assuming

that patients seeking crisis intervention would be experiencing
an overwhelming degree of pressure from external forces in their
lives, predicted and found a significant shift in the internal
direction after

a

six week crisis intervention treatment program.

Non-crisis patients did not evidence a similar shift.

Dua {1970)

used subjects who expressed a concern about their ability to
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interact and relate in interpersonal situations in a study
which employed an eight week program of either behaviorally
oriented action treatment or psychotherapy re-education.
Although both groups showed a significant shift in an internal
direction as compared to a control group, the behaviorally
oriented action program resulted in a significantly greater
shift than the psychotherapy re-education program.
program procedures

The action

were designed to create new behaviors for

dealing with situations where interpersonal anxiety is ·aroused,
thus giving these subjects more effective methods of attaining
personal control over their problems through their own actions.
A study by Gillis and Jessor (1970) goes one step further and
suggests that a shift towards a more internal locus of control
may be a necessary condition for improvement in therapy to
occur.

After ten weeks of therapy, the therapy group shifted

slightly towards a more internal orientation and the no-therapy
group slightly towards a more external orientation, neither
change being significant.

However, when the subjects rated as

improved by their therapists were analysed separately, this
group showed a significant change in the internal direction.
Pierce, Schauble, and Farkas (1970) found that they could
successfully teach internalization behavior to clients within
one therapy session.

During the middle twenty minutes of a

sixty minute session the therapist made the client directly
aware of when he was internalizing or externalizing and gave
positive verbal reinforcement for internalizing behavior.
Recorded excerpts were taken from the first and last twenty
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minutes of the session during which time the therapist primarily
engaged the client with interchangeable reflections.

A compari-

son of the judges ratings of these excerpts revealed a signif icant shift towards internalization behavior from first to the
last twenty minutes of the therapy session.

Lcsyk (1969) pre-

dicted that persons placed in a highly responsive milieu would
increase in their belief in personal control of reinforcement.
Lesyk tested the effect of a token economy, operant conditioning ward on the behavior of a group of female schizophrenic
patients.

The results indicated a significant shift toward a

more internal orientation as measured by the Bialer-Cromwcll
Locus of Control Scale (Bialer, 1961) between the two time
samples studied (weeks 2 to 5 and weeks 12 to 15).

Other

therapy studies which have demonstrated a shift towards greater
internal control include Diamond and Shapiro (1973) with
encounter groups, Foulds (1971) with personal growth groups,
Logan, et. al.
Remainis

(1977) with a values clarification program,

(1974) with behavior modification for early graders

and special counseling efforts to strengthen verbalization of
internality for college students, and Felton and Biggs (1972)
with Gestalt style group psychotherapy for collegiate low
achievers.
Studies employing training programs or structured experiences have demonstrated shifts in locus of control orientation
similar to the therapy studies.

DcCharms (1972) has studied a

concept which he terms Origin-Pawn that is very similar to the
internal-external dimension of locus of control.

Origin behavior

refers to the initiation of intentional behavior by the person
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and Pawn behavior refers to that which is impelled from forces
outside the person.

Thus the lo6us of causality for Origin

behavior is within the person and the person is intrinsically
motivated, while an outside source is the locus of causality
for Pawn behavior and the person is extrinsically motivated.
DeCharms developed a program which emphasized setting realistic
goals, concrete goal directed behavior, evaluation of progress,
and awareness of one's strengths and weaknesses.

The Origin-

Pawn variable was measured by a content analysis of thought
samples.

In the elementary school classes studied, DeCharms

found that the experimental groups which received the special
training increased significantly in Origin behavior while the
control group did not.
Several other studies have demonstrated similar shifts
using locus of control measures as the dependent variable.
Wicker and Tyler (1975) devised instructional games and exercises to help children understand the consequences of inappropriate social behavior.
retarded children.

The subjects were educable mentally

After the twelve week study period the

experimental group was significantly more internal than the
control group on both the Children's Locus of Control Scale
(Bialer, 1961) and the Intellectual Achievement Questionnaire
(Crandall, et. al., 1965).

The groups did not differ signifi-

cantly on the pre-tests. Felton (1973) found a significant
shift in the internal direction for a group of middle level
mental health workers after an 11 month training program.
subjects had participated in intensive group counselling
sessions which emphasized internalization and actuation of

The
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responsible behavior.
An important study by Nowicki and Barnes (1973) investigated the effects of a structured camp experience on the locus
of control orientation of deprived inner-city adolescent campers.
Seven groups of campers were tested prior to and at the conclusion of the week long camping session on the Nowicki-Strickland
Locus of Control Scale (Nowicki and Strickland, 1973).

In

addition, a selected group of campers were asked to return for
an additional week and again tested at the conclusion of this
week.

The camp experience emphasized helping the campers to

feel more in control of events and to better understand the
contingency between their behavior and reinforcements.

An

overall comparison of the groups revealed a shift toward a more
internal orientation.

In addition, the group that returned for

an extra week continued to shift toward a more internal direction.

The importance of the Nowicki and Barnes study lies in

the fact that a personal experience of control over reinforcements evidently led to an increase in internality as measured
by a generalized locus of control scale.
An interesting proposal for a method of modifying locus of
control orientation has been proposed by Chandler (1975).
Chandler's strategy involves a peer teaching peer, where an
externally oriented, low achieving child would function as the
tutor.

Chandler believes that the experience and perception of

personal control over another child would help to bring about a
more internal orientation in the tutor.

Chandler tested this

idea in a pilot study which used underachieving junior high

dU.

school students who scored high on the Children's Locus of
Control Scale (Bailer, 1961) as tutors to underachieving
second and third graders.

The analysis revealed a significant

shift in the internal direction for the tutors.

Although no

control group was used in this study and results must be
interpreted with some caution, it docs add weight to the argument that personal control in a situation may be an important
factor in developing an internal control orientation.
Pehazur and Wheeler (1971)

de~onstrated

that a very simple

procedure may bring about a shift in control orientation as
measured by the Children's Locus of Control Scale.

They had

administered this measure to a group of children while studying
class differences in control orientation and need achievement.
Three months later the minority children were given a short
paragraph to read as part of a reading eY.ercisc.
depicted a boy getting into trouble:

The stories

for odd rows of children

in the class the stories emphasized external reasons for the
boy getting into trouble, while internal reasons were emphasized
in the stories read by children in the even rows.

Following

this, the locus of control measure was again administered.
The group reading the external control story did not change
in control orientation, but the group reading the internal
control paragraph shifted significantly to~ard a more internal
orientation.
The effects of experience and success in

occup~tional

settings on locus of control orientation has also been
in the literature.

docu~entcd

Harvey (1971) asked 50 upper level government

j

l
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administrators to take the Rotter I-E scale.

He found that

internality increased significantly with number of years in
the position.

Harvey suggested that possible factors which

may be involved in this trend could include "considerable
practice in decision making and problem solving, the opportunity to observe the results of their decisions, and a general
feeling of personal importance derived from an aura of respect
and a oelief that their tasks are of significance to others
(p.

982}~"

Gottesfield and Dozier (1966) similarly found that

experienced trainees who had been involved in a community action
program for nine months were significantly more internal than a
group of new recruits matched for age, sex, education and
ethnic background.

Martin and Shepel (1974) demonstrated that

even a brief work skills training program could bring about
modification in locus of control orientation.

After an eighteen

hour training program in counselling skills a group of 21 senio:
nurses shifted significantly toward a more internal locus of
control.
Andrisani and Nestel (1976) provide evidence that points
to successful work experience as being important to the
development and stability of an internal locus of control.
Using 2,972 respondents from the National Longitudinal Survey's
representative sample of middle aged male5lthese authors made
an extensive investigation of the relationshi~ between scores
on a modified Rotter I-E scale and factors involved in the
world of work.

Their study was both cross-sectional and

longitudinal in nature.

Correlational coefficients between

( l 2.)

1969 and 1971 for scores on the I-E scale were only .55 for

Whites and .35 for Blacks.

The authors note that these arc in

marked contrast to the internal consistency reliability
estimates of .75 that had been previously reported.

Andrisani

and Nestel further note that "the data suggest that I-E
expectancies not only change over time, even for middle aged
men, but that the change is in response to changing experience
at the work place.

In particular, there is evidence that

advancement in occupational status,

advancc~cnt

earnings, and reentry into the labor force arc

in annual
systc~atically

related to increasing internal control (pp. 161-162) ."

Thc~c

occupational studies provide support for the contention that
personal control in the sense of experienced

~astcry

of one's

work environment and success arc important contributors to
an internal locus of control.
Several studies investigating the devclopr.ental aspects
of locus of control emphasize the importance of felt mastery
over the environment as being significant to the

dcvclop~cnt

of an internal control orientation. Bialcr (1961), using both
normal and mentally retarded children as subjects, found that
there was a significant tendency among all subjects, regardless
of the normal-mentally retarded classification, to be

~ore

internal on the Childrens' Locus of Control Scale with increasing
age.

In addition, Bialer found Hcntal Age to be a r..ore rele-

vant variable than chronological age.

In fact, chronologi-

cal age was found to carry no significant weight when the
effects of mental age were partiallcd out.

In a si=ilar study,

Penk (1969) tested five groups of children, ranging in age

(13.)

from seven to eleven years old, on the Chilcrens' Locus of
Control Scale.

His findings revealed an increase in internality

with increasing age.

The pattern of correlations of locus of

control score with chronological age and Peabody Picture Test
mental ages led Penk to conclude that children employing more
mature verbal abstractions also tended to be more internal.
Lao (1974) gave a Personal Data Questionnaire and the Rotter
I-E scale to subjects in seven age groups from fifteen to
eighty-five years of age.

An increasing internal locus of

control orientation from fifteen to thirty-nine years of age
accompanied a reported increased sense of mastery and control
over the environment, while a stabilized locus of control
accompanied the more stabilized life style of that period
after age 39.
Three further studies, two serendipitous in nature,
highlight the way personal experiences of control or no control
may effect locus of control orientation.

Gorman (1968)

just

happened to give the Rotter I-E scale to a group of college
students the day after the 1968 Democratic National Convention.
These students, most of whom were McCarthy supporters, scored
significantly more external than previously reported means for
college students.

Gorman suggests that the experienced dis-

appointment of these students may have been a factor in these
findings.

In a similar chance finding, McArthur (1970)

administered the Rotter I-E scale to a group of Yale undergraduates on the day after the draft lottery.

Students who

were old enough to be effected by the lottery were significantly
more external than a similar group of students tested before

,---------

\ ..i..

the lottery (p(.10).

.j • )

When .McArthur separated the external

group into those who were favorably effected by the lottery
and those who were not, he found that the former were signif icantly more external than the latter (p<.05), and largely
accounted for the greater externality in the experimental group
as compared to the control group.

.McArthur's concluding

remarks suggest the relevance of luck in these findings.

Prior

to the lottery all subjects could reasonably have expected to
be drafted upon graduation unless they could secure some sort
of deferment.

After the lottery then, only those subjects

favorably effected experienced a real change in draft status.
Because of their high numbers in the draft these subjects
could reasonably expect not to be drafted.

McArthur maintains

that these subjects clearly experienced a stroke of good luck,
while the lottery did not as clearly bring bad

luck to those

not favorably effected since their position in regard
draft remained relatively the same.

to the

Lefcourt (1972) reports

an unpublished study by Kiehlbauch (1968) which presents
similar data in that personal experiences of personal control
and no control appeared to significantly effect locus of
control orientation.

Kiehlbauch found greater externality

upon admission and just prior to release as compared to the
interim period of their incarceration for a group of reformatory inmates.

Lefcourt suggests that this finding may relate

to the uncertainty and helplessness in terms of coping
experienced at the time of admission and release compared to
the stability and opportunity for successful coping behavior
during the intermediate period.

(15.)

A series of studies "dealing with changes in expectancy
for future success have demonstrated that subjects respond
differentially under skill and chance situations.

Phares

(1957) investigated subjects expectancies for future reinforcement in two task situations:
ing lengths of lines.

matching colors and match-

Phares manipulated chance and skill

conditions through differential instructions, half of the subjects were led to believe that skill was involved in making
these discriminations, while the other half of the subjects
were led to believe that the discriminations were so hard that
success was largely a matter of guesswork.

All subjects

received an equal number of reinforcements. In spite of this,
subjects under chance instructions made smaller and less frequent
expectancy changes in relation to reinforcement feedback than
did subjects under skill conditions.

In essence, subjects

given skill instructions responded more in line with environmental cues than did subjects given chance instructions.

Two

further studies, one using differential instructions to manipulate skill and chance situations (James and Rotter, 1958) and
the other using two different tasks for the same purpose (Rotter,
Liverant, and Crowne, 1961) ,report similar results.

The major

finding in these studies was that the typical partial reinforcement effect of being more resistant to extinction than 100%
reinforcement was. true only for subjects given chance instructions.

For subjects given skill instructions, 100% reinforcement

was more resistant to extinction than 50% reinforcement.

In

other words, perceived personal control had a strong effect
upon the subject's continuing to respond after extinction was

(lG.)

initiated.

Since task specific expectancies for control of

reinforcements were evidently effected differentially by
personal control as manipulated by skill and chance situations
in these studies, a logical extension of this finding is the
possibility that the more generalized control expectancies as
measured by locus of control scales might also be similarly
effected.
A number of studies have explored the effects of success
and failure on post-task attributions of causality.

Although

the post-task measures of attribution are not locus of control
measures in a strict sense, they do provide a task specific
measure of control orientation.

These studies then, are rele-

vant to the effects of success versus failure in the same way
the expectancy level studies were relevant to personal control
(skill) versus no personal control (chance) effects.

That is,

if success and failure have significant differential effects
on post-task attributions of causality, then it is a reasonable possibility that similar effects might be reflected in a
post-task measure of locus of control.
Streufert and Streufert (1969) studied decision making with
pairs of subjects.

The results relevant to the present study

showed that the dyads took increasingly more credit for success
as success increased, but did not take more responsibility
for failure as it was increased.

In a simila~ study, Sobel

(1974) examined the effects of success and failure on an
anagrams task with subjects classified as either internals or
externals based on Rotter's (1966) norms.

The analysis

revealed that success on the task resulted in attribution to
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internal factors

(intelligence, ability to concentrate and

think quickly, skill in problem solving) while failure produced
attribution to external factors (item difficulty, amount of
time allotted, features of the work environment, and time of
day) .

Sobel found the moderating variables of personality

to be weak (internal versus external).

Johnson, Feigenbaum,

and Weiby (1964) had their subjects teach arithmetic via a
microphone to two fictitious students they thought were in tl1e
next room.

The subjects were then told that sudent A had done

very well and student B poorly.

The subjects were asked to

teach an additional arithmetic lesson and student D either
continued to do poorly or improved after this lesson.

The

subjects for whom student B continued to do poorly attributed
the reasons to the student (external factors) while the subjects
for whom student B improved attributed it to an improved
teaching presentation on their part (internal factors).
A study by Eisenman (1972) provides evidence that personal
control has a clear effect on locus of control.

Eisenman

directly examined the effects of personal control determined
by skill and chance instructions on subjects
Rotter I-E scale.
students.

rc!;por:sc~

to the

The subjects in this study were 150 college

one hundred of these subjects participated in three

verbal conditioning experiments in which they had to decide
which pronoun another student had used to begin each of 30
sentences.

Fifty of these subjects were instructed that their

"clinical sensitivity" could lead to excellent guesses as to
the correct pronoun, while the other fifty were told that

( l H. )

correct guessing would be of a random nature.

The former

instructions were designed to emphasize the person's internal
skills as being important in determining the results, while the
latter instructions were designed to suggest that performance
results were beyond the subjects control.

A third group of

50 subjects, used as control, wrote stories to Thematic Apperccption Test cards on three different occasions.

The subjects

were tested on a pre and post basis with the Rotter I-E scale.
There were no significant differences among the three groups on
the pre-test.

On the post-test, the group taking part in the

experiments emphasizing internal skills showed a significant
change in the internal direction (-2.50).

The group taking

part in the experiments emphasizing random guessing showed a
significant change in the external direction {+2.10).
control group did not change significantly (+.75).

Tl1c

Eisen~an

states that "the present findings suggest that experience in
situations which the subject believes reflect his own control
over events can increase the likelihood of his believing that
he has control over reinforcements.

Likewise, repeated

experience in situations where the subject feels he has no
control can diminish his feelings of being able to control
his environment (p. 435)".
A study by Epstein and Ko~orita (1971) provides clear
evidence concerning the effects of success and failure on
subjects' responses to locus of control ~casurcs.

These

investigators developed a fourteen ite~ locus of control scale
with reworded items from the Children's Locus of Control Scale
and Battle and Rotter's (196]) Children's Picture Test of
Internal-External control.

The subjects took part in a line

( 19.)

.

matching task and were given falsified success-failure feedback .
The subjects, 120 Black children, were asked then to answer the
locus of control measure in direct relation to the task situation.

The results revealed a significant difference in

scores on the locus of control measure between subjects experiencing success

(X =

(X =

28.93) and subjects experiencing failure

30.90), with success producing scores in a more internal

direction.

Although pre and post measures were not taken in

this study, and only inferences can be made concerning the
modification of locus of control, the results do clearly
suggest the significance of success and failure as having
effects on locus of control.

Epstein and Komorita attempted

to assess change in locus of control by using the same subjects
in a similar task situation one week later.

The subjects were

again given falsified success-failure feedback producing four
treatment groups (success-success, success-failure, failurefailure, and failure-success).

The same locus of control

measure was administered after the task situation along with
several other tests.

Unfortunately, during the second task

and testing situation, the subjects manifested fatigue,
restlessness, and loss of interest.

The experimenters questioned

the reliability of this data and for that reason did not report
it.
Brecher and Denmark (1972), with a serendipitous finding,
provide evidence that no personal control and failure feedback
have an effect on locus of control orientation.

These investi-

gators had given the Rotter I-E scale to three classes, consisting of 88 female undergraduates at Hunter College, within
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a one week time span.

One of the classes had taken an examina-

tion and were due to receive their grades on the day of the
testing.

When the authors learned of this they decided to

take advantage of the situation.

Immediately preceeding the

administration of the I-E scale the instructor of this class
told these 22 subjects that she would not be returning their
exam papers as promised.

She then told them that it was the

worst set of papers she had ever seen and that over half the
class had failed, with the rest doing poorly.

She further

added that she was very disappointed and would not discuss
the matter any further ..

The instructor then briefly introduced

the experimenter and then left.

The results indicate that

these subjects scored significantly more external

(X = 13.0)

on the Rotter I-E scale than the subjects in the other two
classes (10.41).

Brecher and Denmark conclude that subjects

"given negative feedback concerning examination results with
no apparent recourse (opportunity to see or discuss results)
appeared significantly more external than the control groups
(p. 462) ."
A thorough review of the literature on the development
and modification of locus of control led Allin (1978) to
posit personal control (skill instructions) versus no personal
control (chance instructions) and success versus failure as
critical factors in the modification of locus of control.
He hypothesized that taking part in a skill task would result
in a shift in locus of control orientation in an internal
direction while participation in a chance task would result
in greater externality.

He also predicted that success feedback
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would produce a shift in the internal direction and failure
feedback a shift in the external direction.

In a design unique

to the locus of control literature, Allin tested these hypotheses by taking pre and post-task measurements of locus of
control using a slightly modified version of the Rotter I-E
scale.

Allin described the personalities of three fictitious

persons and -informed the subjects that these persons had
previously taken a word association test.

The task of Allin's

subjects was to try to respond to the ten word association
items with the same words as the persons described.

Personal

control and no personal control conditions were manipulated
by skill and chance instructions, respectively.

The skill

instructions emphasized the logical connection between the
words and the importance of the subject's clinical sensitivity
in making the correct responses.

The chance instructions

emphasized luck and the lack of control on the subject's
part in determining the correct responses.

The success-

failure conditions were manipulated by providing falsified
feedback.

The design also included a no feedback condition

and a control group which received ambiguous (no skill or
chance bias ) instructions and no feedback.
The results of Allin 1 s analysis yielded a significant
three-way interaction (task

in~tructions

X type of feedback

X trials) and- a significant two-way interaction under the
succes~ condition (task instructions X trials).

A further

breakdown of the data- failed to yield any significant results.
Thus no conclusions can be drawn from these results concerning
the main effects of the independent variables.

In concluding
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Allin also states that "based on the results of this investigation it is evident that further research is necessary in order
to draw conclusions about the nature of tl1e interaction (p. 42)".
It is the contention of the present study that the ambiguity of Allin's results may have been due primarily to his use
of the Rotter I-E scale as the measure of locus of control.
The Rotter I-E scale has been criticized primarily with respect
to the following three issues:

1.

persons and reinforcement areas;
trol;

3.

generalization across
2.

agents of external con-

types of reinforcement-positive versus negative

{Crandall, et. al., 1965; Lefcourt, 1976).

It is possible that

the defects in the Rotter I-E scale with respect to any of
these three issues could have contributed to obscuring Allin's
results.

For this reason each of these issues will be discus-

sed separately.
Gurin, Gurin, Lao, and Beattie (1969) were the first to
criticize the Rotter I-E scale in terms of being too general
in nature.

Gurin, et. al., examined the responses of a group

of Southern Black college students to the Rotter I-E scale and
other personal and racially oriented items.

Factor analysis

of these items revealed two distinct factors, one dealing
with reinforcement contingencies for the particular person
(personal control), and the other dealing with contingencies
for the culture at large (control ideology).

The personal

control items on the Rotter I-E scale (sec appendix A) , all
of which are phrased in the first person include, 13, 9, 28,
and 25 in order of their loadings.

The control ideology items,
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only one of which is worded explicitly in the first person,
include 16, 11, 6, 23, 7, 10, 26, 20, and 18 in order of
their loading.

Gurin, ct. al., studied the rclationsllips

between three control scores (personal control, control ideology,
and total score) and a variety of motivational and performance
measures. From their results Gurin, ct. al., concluded that
only rarely do personal control and control ideology operate
the same way, it usually being personal control that relates
to measures of motivation and performance, i.e., high internal
personal control leads to high motivation and performance.
These investigators also found, however, that it was externality
on the control ideology factor that related to willingness to
get involved with social action and the choosing of atypical
careers for Blacks.

Sanger and Alker (1972) reported a Gimilar

personal control versus control ideology factor structure in
a college age srunplc of feminists and non activist controls.
Joe (1974) found that attributions of causality were related
to personal control scores but showed little
control ideology scores.

rclation~hip

to

On an ambiguous task, high personal

control as compared to low personal control subjects

pcrc~ived

that successful outcomes were determined by skill rather than
chance, exhibited a lower tendency to attribute causality to
physical surroundings and experimental factors for task failures,
and indicated that they tried harder on successful than on
failure outcomes.
chanyed

It is possible that Allin's subjects

differ~ntially

on these two factors, with the personal
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control factor being more likely to reflect changes as a result
of personal control versus no personal control and successfailure feedback mctnipulations.
Lao (1970), extending the research of Gurin, et. al.

(1969), found similar results, that

i~an

internal belief in

personal control was positively related to measures of academic
competence and an external belief in control ideology was
positively related to innovative,' behavior for Black college
students.

Lao concluded that, "the personal and ideological

variables are not only independent in a correlational sense
(r

=

.124), bµt they are also independent in the sense that

neither effects how the other operates (p. 270) .
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Lao also

raised questions as to the development of these two expectancies
and suggested that the socialization of the two may differ in
many ways.
While the preceeding studies question the reliability
of the Rotter I-E scale in terms of its generality across
persons (who's control is being referred to), Mirels (1970)
and others have found two factors which differentiate in terms
of reinforcement areas.

Mirels' two factors were a belief

.concerning felt masteryover one's life (items 25, 11, 15, 16,

23, 18, 28, 5, 10) and a belief concerning the extent to which
the individual citizen is deemed capable of exerting an impact
on political institutions (items 17~ 22, 12, 29).

Several

other investigators have found similar factors (John and Jahn,

1973;

Abrahamson, Schludermann, and Schludermann, 1973;

Viney, 1974;

Cherlin and Bourque, 1974).

(25.)

Abramowitz (1973) and O'Leary,et.al. (1975) have offered empirical
support for Mirels' two factors.

Abramowitz found that political

commitment in a group of college students was effectively
predicted by scores on the political factor, but not by scores
on the nonpolitical items or by the whole scale.

O'Leary found

a significant shift toward internality in a group of alchoholics
after treatment.

When he examined these results in terms of

Mirels' two factors, he found that there was a similar significant shift in the personal but not in the sociopolitical items.
Other researchers have found additional factors.

Collins

(et. al., 1973; 1974) separated the 23 forced choice items of
the Rotter I-E scale into 46 Likert scale items and found four
factors which he labeled difficulty of world, unjust world,
predictability-luck, and political responsiveness.

Reid and

Ware(l973) originally found. two factors similar to Mirels
which they called fatalism and social system control.

In a

later study (Reid and Ware, 1974) they added items which dealt
.with self control of impulses, desires, and emotion and found
that this added an important third factor not represented in
the Rotter I-E scale.
The evidence presented in this discussion points to the
importance of examining locus of control factors separately
when using scores on a locus of control measure as the dependent
variable, since variance on one factor could obscure variance
on the other factor.

Allin attempted to deal with this issue

by omitting the politically oriented items from the Rotter I-E
scale (3, 12, 17, 22, 29).

It would have been interesting to

compare changes in control orientations aG assessed by thesP
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two factors had Allin included these items.

Allin's method

of controlling for generality in ·the Rotter I-E scale can be
criticized on two counts.

First, omitting items may have

implications in terms of the reliability of the scale, and
secondly Allin's choice of items to omit did not take into
consideration the other factors which have been found, most
notably those of Gurin, et. al, and Collins.

A more effective

method of dealing with the issue of generalization might be
to use a more specific locus of control measure.
The results which Allin obtained on a skill-chance rating
scale employed on a pre and post-task basis in the same study
clearly point in this direction.

The personal control group

initially rated the task as involving skill.

After receiving

feedback those subjects who failed changed significantly
toward a more chance rating while those receiving success
feedback did not change significantly in their ratings.

On the

other hand, subjects in the no personal control group initially
rated the task as one involving chance.

Of these subjects

only those receiving success feedback significantly changed
their ratings, this being in the direction of indicating that
more skill was involved.

Allin argues "that this measure of

control orientation, although initially biased by task instructions does have the advantage of being more situation-specific
and subjective than such a measure as the Rotter I-E scale
{pp. 52-53)."
Other researchers have found success using more specific
measures of locus of control.

Neuman (1977), studying risk

used a final decision made by the subjects as a specific locus
of control measure.

The results indicated that internals were

( 2 7. )

significantly more risky than externals when the specific
locus of control measure was used to classify subjects.
When the Rotter I-E Scale was used to classify subjects,
similar trends were noted, but the results were not significant.
Bradley (1977) developed a scale to measure specific
control expectancies in three achievement domains (intellectual, social, and physical).

The Locus of Control Inventory

for Three Achievement Domains (LOCITAD) contains 48 items to be
answered yes or no, with half the items in each domain measuring control orientation for successful outcomes and half for
unsuccessful outcomes.· Bradley and Webb (1976) predicted an
increase in perceived control from adolescence to middle
adulthood followed by a decline in old age for the physical and
social subscales and a relatively stable control orientation
for the intellect~al subscale.

They believed that locus of

control scores on these subscales would reflect the rise in
physical and social abilities that adulthood brings, followed
by the decline in physical abilities and loss of power and
productivity in social situations which accompanies old age.
They also maintained that the relative stability of mental
functioning across the age span tested would be reflected in
the stable intellectual subscale scores.
were included in the study:
60

~

90.

Four age categories

13 - 18, 19 - 25, 35 - 50, and

In general, the results supported the hypotheses.

Adults over 60 scored significantly more external than
individuals from the three .other age groups on the physical
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subscale, adolescents and persons over 60 scored significantly
more external than did the 35 - 50 age group on the social
subscale,

and no reliable age differences were noted on the

intellectual subscale.

Bradley and Gaa (1977) demonstrated

that an experimental manipulation could modify control
orientation in one domain while not in others.

A group of

students participated in five weekly goal setting conferences
designed to increase internality with regard to academic
achievement.

The results indicated that these students were

significantly more internal on the intellectual subscale of
LOCITAD and the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility
Questionnaire after the five conferences as compared to two
control groups.

No significant differences were found on

the social and physical subscale of LOCITAD.
McKee (1976) has also developed a scale to differentiate
specific domains of expectancy for contr9l which he calls the
Multidimensional Expectancy Control Scale.

This measure con-

tains subscales to assess locus of control in the political,
academic, and interpersonal realms.

Little work has been done

with this scale, but McKee did find that the academic subscale
scores (internal control) correlated significantly with
cumulative grade point averages in a positive direction,
while a similar correlation using scores on the Rotter I-E scale
did not reach significance.
Kirscht (1972) compared a general locus of control measure
with a measure specific to health belief in terms of their
accuracy in predicting health related activities.

He found
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the general scale to be a better predictor of reported vulnerability and belief in the efficacy of preventive action,
while the health control measure was a better predictor of
action taken in health related activities.

A low correlation

(0.29) was found between these two scales.

In a follow up

study reported in the same article Kirscht found more consistency between the general and heaith specific scales.

In

this study, however, he differentiated between expectancy
and motivation items, which other researchers have not done,
making the results difficult to interpret.
A study by Wallston, Wallston, Kaplan, and Maides (1976)
in·the area of
picture.

h~alth

cbntrol expectancies provides a clearer

They developed an 11-item Likert scale designed as

a measure of control expectancy specific to health related
behavior.

It was predicted in this study that subjects who

held an internal control expectancy and highly valued health
would choose to expose themselves to more health related
information than internal persons who valued health less or
than externals, regardless of the value they placed on health.
This prediction was confirmed with the use of the Health Locus
of Control Scale but not with the Rotter I-E scale.

It was

also found that subjects were more satisfied with a weight
reduction program that was consistent with their locus of
control orientation than one that was not, i.e., internally
oriented with a self directed program and externally oriented
with a group program.

Again these results were significant

when the Health Locus of Control Scale was used but not when
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the Rotter I-E scale was used.

The results with regard

to

weight actually lost were consistent with the hypothesis,
though not significant, with the Health Locus of Co~trol Scale,
but in the direction opposite to prediction when the Rotter
I-E scale was used.
Lewis,

Cheney~

and Dawes (1977), using the Rotter I-E

scale as a model, developed a 19-item forced choice scale to
specifically assess the amount of control experienced in
interpersonal interactions.

In two studies reported by

Cheney, et. al., the Locus of Control of Interpersonal Relationships Questionnaire correlated significantly with the rated
job effectiveness of camp counselors, while the Rotter I-E scale
did not.
In general, then, the trend in locus of control research
seems to be toward the use of more specific measures rather
than the more generalized scales such as the Rotter I-E.

These

scales have been demonstrated to be more effective than the
multidimensional Rotter I-E scale, especially when examining relationships in particular situations or areas of
concern.
The second major criticism of the Rotter I-E scale
deals with agents of external control.

The Rotter I-E scale

includes a variety of sources of external control which have
not been demonstrated to be synonomous with each other.

Hersch

and Schiebe (1967), for instance, found that on the Adjective
Check List, 23 adjectives were checked significantly more
often by individuals· classified as internals, presenting a

( 31.)

fairly coherent picture (clever, efficient, egotistical,
enthusiastic, independent, self-confident, ambitious, assertive, boastful, conceited, conscientious, deliberate, perservering, clear-thinking, dependable, determined, reasonable,
and stubborn).

Only one adjective, however, was checked

significantly more often by subjects classified as externals,
this being "self-pitying".

Hersch and Scheibe conclude

that there may be a diversity in the psychological meaning
of externality with a person evidencing external control for
a wide variety of reasons, including:
or physically weak;

2.

"l.

being realistically

being in a highly competitive situa-

tion where the actions of others have a significant effect on
his chances for success;

3.

a belief in luck or fate;

4.

may develop feelings of persecution with or without reason
(pp. 612-613)

"

Levenson (1973a, 1974) has developed a scale which differentiates between agents of external control.
consists of 24 items presented in Likert format.

The scale
Three sub-

scalPs of eight items each measure "internality", "control by
powerful others", and "control by chance".

Factor rinalysis

revealed that the scales are conceptually independent with
little overlap.

In a study using normal and psychiatric

subjects, Levenson (1973a) found that the scale made interesting
discriminations.

Patients and normal subjects 'did not differ

on the internality scale, but the psychiatric patients were
significantly more external on the powerful others and chance
scales.

Psychotics scored significantly more external than
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neurotics on the powerful others and chance scales.

For

patients who were in the hospital· 60 days or more, paranoids
scored significantly more external on the powerful others
scale than did patients diagnosed schizophrenic undifferentiated.
Committed patients were significantly more external on the
control by powerful others scale than voluntary patients.

In

a later study, Levenson (1974) found that, as predicted, only
a belief in chance was differentially related to involvement
and knowledge in antipollution activities.

Levenson theorized

that belief in control by powerful others and low expectancies
for self control do not diminish activity since the potential
for control is still present, while for the person with a
high belief in chance there is no hope for control.

Male

subjects who believed less in the operation of chance factors
were more likely to be involved in antipollution activities.
Also, among those who were members of an antipollution
group, those who were high on the chance scale were less
knowledgeable about pollution.
among the female subjects.

Similar results were not found

Levenson concludes that "although

the control by powerful others scale and the chance scale were
correlated with each other, they behaved very differently in
their relationship to involvement and information.

It appears

that these orientations are tapping quite different beliefs and
therefore should not Le grouped Logcther under the rubric of
external control (p. 380)".
Tiffany (1967, 1973) developed a scale which dirferentiate~ four factors:

1.

controlling forces such as gut level

impulses experienced as coming from internal

sources~

~.

self controlling mechanisms one perceives himself to have
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over internal forces;

3.

)

social skills or abilities to

manipulate the environment that one experiences himself as
having;

4.

the experience of social customs or pressures

corning from environmental sources.
O'Leary, et. al.

Both Tiffany (1967) and

(1976) have demonstrated the usefulness of this con-

ceptualization in evaluating treatment programs.
The evidence concerning agents of external control again
points to the possibility that differential responding to
the various parameters of external control contained in the
Rotter I-E scale may .obscure results when used as a measure
for the dependent variable, as in the Allin study.
The third major point of criticism of the Rotter I-E
scale, the issue of types of reinforcement, is particularly
relevant to Allin's study since type of feedback was one
of the two independent variables.

The Rotter I-E scale not

only does not discriminate between control expectancies for
successful and failure outcomes, but, as Sobel (1974) points
out, is biased in the failure direction.

Sobel found that

scores on the Rotter I-E scale correlated with attribution
to internal and external factors only in the failure condition.
He suggested that this result may be due to the fact that of
the 13 items that are explicitly oriented toward either
positive or negative outcomes, ten involve negative outcomes.
Sobel concludes that "if this explanation of the data is
correct i t should be possible to obtain the predicted correlations
between locus of control andpost-perforrnance attribution over
all conditions by developing a scale which balances the number
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of success and failure oriented items (p. 33) ".
Crandall, Katkovsky, and Crandall (1965) developed the
Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire to
measure both control expectancies for positive outcomes r+
subscale) and negative outcomes (I

subscale) in addition to

a general score for control orientation which is the sum of
the two subscales.

The validational study on the IAR presented

evidence that supports the contention that control orientation
for positive outcomes is different from control orientation
for negative outcomes.

Crandall, et. al., noting that the

reliability coefficients for the I
those for the I + subscale (I -

=

subscale were greater than

.74, I + = .66 for 47 third,

fourth, and fifth grade children);

(I

=

.69, I +

=

.47 for

70 ninth graders) suggested that since previous studies have
found negative social reinforcement to be more effective than
positive reinforcement (Crandall, 1963; Crandall, Good and
Crandall, 1964), "it may possibly be that the greater impact
of punishment produces a more durable effect on the internalexternal responsibility beliefs surrounding these experiences
(p. 101) ."

In support of this reasoning, McGhee and Crandall

(1968) found the I

subscale to be a consistently better pre-

dictor of academic achievement.
Crandall, et. al (1965) also found the correlations
between the I- and I+ subscales to be generally low, which they
maintained indicated the independence of the two subscales.
The correlations between the subscales were especially low for
children in the lower grades, which raises the possibility
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that control orientations for positive outcomes may be
developed.independent of control orientations for negative
outcomes.
Solomon, Houlihan, Busse, and Parelius (1971) observed
parents helping their children in problem solving situations.
They found that mothers who usually rejected or disagreed
with their son's comments, had sons who scored low on the I+
subscale of the IAR, i.e., tended to be external in control
orientation for positive outcome.

Boys with mothers who usually

accepted and agreed with them, tended to be more external on
the I- subscale.

This finding also suggests that control

orientations for positive and negative outcomes may develop
differentially.

These authors interpret this finding by

reasoning that, "if agreement/acceptance represents (or includes)
positive reinforcement, it may be that boys who receive much
of it come to expect that their achievement efforts will
generally meet with approval and therefore assign unexpected
negative reinforcements to external causes.

By the same

reasoning, boys who typically receive negative responses may
~ust

come to believe that any positive reinforcements received
not be due to their own efforts (p. 231) ."

Mischel, Zeiss, and Zeiss (1974) developed the Stanford
Preschool Internal-External Scale (SPIES) which, like the !AR,
also provides I
score.

+ and I - subscales in addition to a total I

The SPIES consists of 14 forced choice (internal

versus external) items, six describing a positive and eight a
negative event, and is scored in an internal direction.

Thus

the maximum scores for the I + , I - , and total I scales are 6,
8, and 14, respectively.

Normative data were presented for

211 subjects (98 male and 113 female)
School of Stanford University.
the I+ and I
other.

from the Bing Nursery

As was the case with the IAR,

subscales of the SPIES were not related to each

Correlations on the two subscales were .03, -.06, and

-.02 for males, females, and the total sample respectively,
none approaching significance.

In three delay of gratifica-

tion studies involving a positive reward, I + but not I - or
total I was significantly correlated with relevant instrumental activity.

In two studies in which responses to negative

events were studied only I

correlated. significantly with

relevant instrumental activity.

The authors concluded that

"in spite of the small number of items within the I+ and I
subscales, the significant correlations of each subscale with
conceptually relevant behavioral measures were in all of the
cases larger than those obtained from using the total I score.
Thus, any advantage that the total I scale might have because
it contains twice as many items as the subscales is more than
offset by mixing together positive and negative outcomes (p. 277) ."
DuCuette, Wolk, and Soucar (1972) compared maladjusted and
normal children with respect to their IAR scores.

They found

that it was ''neither internality nor eiternality per se that
is related to maladjustive behavior, but is instead the
relationship between these two in regard to different kinds
of events that is important (p. 294) ."

While scores on the

two subscales were relatively homogenious for normal children,
there were important differences between scores on the two
subscales from the maladjusted children.

The results indicated
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that the White problem child and the high IQ problem chil.d
scored high on the I

subscale and low on the I + subscale,

i.e., they assume a great deal of credit for their failures
but very little for their successes.

The opposite pattern

was displayed by the Black problem child and the low IQ
problem child.
and low on the I

These children scored high on the I+ subscale
subscale, indicating that they tend to

assume responsibility for their successes but not their failures.

From this data it is evident that the use of a scale

such as the Rotter I-E scale which does not discriminate
between control orientation for positive and negative outcomes
might mask important differences in control expectancies
within the individual.
Taken together, the studies which have been discussed
concerning the issue of type of reinforcement seem to indicate
that control orientation for positive outcomes is relatively
independent of control orientation for negative outcomes, and
that the two may develop differentially.

If this is true, it

is reasonable to assume that control orientation for positive
and negative outcomes may also undergo differential modif ication with respect to the independent variables in Allin's
study, especially the variable of type of feedback.

For

instance, a subject receiving success feedback might become
more internal, in line with Allin's hypothesis, but only for
positive outcomes, while changing little or not at all with
respect to control orientation for negative outcomes.

The

converse might be expected for the subject receiving failure

--------
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feedback, that is; become more external with regard

to

negative outcomes but change little in control orientation
for positive outcomes.

This data concerning type of reinforce-

ment again points to Lhe possibility that Allin's use of the
Rotter I-E scale, which does not discriminate between control
orientations for positive and negative outcomes, may have
obscured the results.
To summarize, the Rotter I-E scale which was used in
Allin's study, has been criticised for its multidimensionality
with regard

to three issues, generalization across persons

and reinforcement areas, agents of ,external control, and types
of feedback.

The purpose of the present study was to provide

a clearer picture of the operation of situational control and
type of feedback in the modification of locus of control orientation.

The Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Question-

naire was designed to improve on the Rotter I-E scale with
regard to the previously mentioned three issues by it's specificity to the academic achievement situation, limitation to
significant others as agents of external control, and provision of separate subscales to measure control orientations
for

p~sitive

and negative outcomes (Crandall et. al., 1965).

For these reasons the IAR was used in the present investigation.

In addition, a task specific measure of control orien-

tation developed by Epstein and Komorita (1971) was used for
comparison with the IAR, in an attempt to better understand
how control expectancies in a specific situation may generalize
to a larger sphere.
The following hypotheses were tested:

Personal control

in a skill situation will lead to an increase in internal
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control while no personal control in a chance situation will
lead to an increase in external control.

In addition, it was

predicted that success feedback would result in increased
internal control and failure feedback in increased external
control.

No interaction effects were predicted due to the

lack of sufficient previous research.
It should also be noted that the Allin study did not
control for sex factors.

There has been some evidence that

control orientations may develop differentially in the two
sexes (Crandall, et. al., 1965), with different parental
factors being more important for one sex than for the other
(Katkovsky, Crandall, and Good, 1967).

Also, internal control

generaly relates to high achievement behavior for males but
not for females (Crandall, et. al., 1965;
1971;

Boor, 1973).

Nowicki and Roundtree,

Several investigators have suggested a

social desireability factor for females to explain this finding.
McDonald and Tseng (1971)

found a third factor, in addition

to the two reported by Mirels (1970,), with a sample of women.
This factor pertained to the controlability of being liked or
respected.

Duke and Nowicki (1974), found that internality

related to high achievement for males while it was externality
that related to high achievement for females on the newly
developed Adult Nowicki Strickland Internal External Scale.
Nowicki and Walker (1973), found that with social desireability
controlled for, females scoring low on a social desireability
scale and high internal on a locus of control measure, were
high achievers as measured by achievement test scores.

Both

(40.)

of the previously cited studies suggest that some females
may deny responsibility for their. academic achievements
because of the social undesirability of feeling themselves
as in competition with men.

The evidence for differential

responding by males and females, however, was considered not
substantial enough to indicate the use of sex as an independent
variable.

Post hoc analyses were planned only if it was apparent

from the data that sex factors were operating.

,----
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B. METHOD
1.

SUBJECTS
A total of 54 middle school (grades 6 - 8) children from

two private schools in Richmond, Virginia, were employed on a
voluntary basis for participation in the present study.

Twenty-

four of the subjects were male students from St. Christopher's
School and 30 were female students from St. Catherine's School.
The breakdown of subjects for grades was as follows:
24, Seventh - 26, Sixth - 4.

Eighth -

Two subjects who had already

taken part in the second experimental session were dropped
from the study when it was discovered that they did not answer
all the Locus of Control Scale items.

Twelve other subjects

took part in the pre-testing but not in the task situation and
thus were not used in the analysis.
2.

APPARATUS AND MATERIALS
a.

Setting
The initial phase of the study was conducted in the

auditorium at St. Christopher's School and a large classroom at St. Catherine's School.

This enabled the experi-

menter to administer the pre-tests to a large number of
students at the same time.

The task situation and post-

testing were administered in smaller rooms at each school.
b.

Locus of Control Scales
Two locus of control measures were used on a pre

and post-task basis in the present investigation.

The

Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire
was chosen because it is specific to the academic achieve-
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ment situation, limits agents of external control to
significant others in the child's life, and provides
separate subscales for measuring control orientations
for positive and negative events in addition to a total
score.

MacDonald (1973)

states that "the IAR is a care-

fully developed scale that shows acceptable reliability
and evidence of divergent and convergent validity (p. 195) ."
Correlations with social desirability test scores have
been found to be rather low.

Additionally,the IAR is

one of the most wid~ly used Children's locus of control
measures.

Prociuk and Lussier (1975), in their biblio-

graphy for 1974-1975, report that it was the most widely
used scale with children for that period, and was used
in 6% of all studies dealing with locus of control.

A

copy of the IAR and scoring instructions appear in
Appendix B.
The Lotus of Control Scale for Success-Failure
developed by Epstein and Komorita (1971) was also used
in the present study.

To this writer's knowledge this

scale was only used in the previously mentioned study
by Epstein and Komorita.

It was used in the present study

because the items are worded in such a manner that the
scale can be used to provide a measure of control orientation specific to the task situation.

Epstein and Komorita

developed the scale by rewording 34 items obtained from
Bialer's (1961) Locus of Control Scale and Battle and
Rotter's (1963) Picture Test of Internal-External Control.

(.SJ.)

An item analysis of these 34 items consisted of correlations with total score (internal consistency criterion),
yielding 14 items which discriminated significantly at
the 5% level.

These 14 items were used as the Locus of

Control Scale for Success-Failure.

Epstein and Komorita

(1971) report that the split-half reliabilities, with the
Spearman-Brown correction, were .79 and .70 under success
and failure conditions respectively and conclude that the
scale is moderately reliable and adequate.

Sec Appendix

D for a copy of the Locus of Control Scale for SuccessFailure and scoring instructions.
c.

Additional Printed Materials
Various task instruction and answer sheets, conocnt

forms, and debriefing sheets, all of which arc explained
in the experimental procedures, were used.
3.

PROCEDURE
A consent form which briefly described the experimental

procedures, was sent hor.1c with a nu.'":1bcr of students for their
parents to read over and sign.

Only those students whose

parents gave permission were used in the study.
subjects were asked to read and sign

a~

infor~ed

Also, all
consent !orm

(sec Appendix M).
The experimenter met with the subjects in three large
groups for the first of two sessions.
session was to obtain

~easures

The purpose cf this

of the subject's control

orientation prior to taking part in the

expcri~ental

task

(Lt

situation.

'c • I

The initial instructions given to the subjects

were as follows:
Scientists do experiments to find out more about
the world around us.
Some experiments study people
and their behavior.
I am particularly interested
in finding out more about what is involved in the
process of succeeding or failing at coming up with
new ideas or discoveries.
In about two weeks I
will meet with each of you individually. You will
be asked to read about several experiments. and decide
what was discovered in those experiments. To give
you a better understanding of what you will be expected
to do, I'm going to give you a sample of the task now.
The task consisted of a brief description of an experiment
followed by a list of ten possible results.

The subjects were

instructed to read the experiment carefully and then to indicate
whether or not they thought the listed results were actually
found in the experiment by writing true or false in front of
each statement.

The experiment described in the sample task

and the three later used in the experimental task situation were
fictitious.
debriefed.

The subjects were unaware of this until they were
A copy of the sample task appears in Appendix H

and instructions in Appendix G.
The experimenter read over the sample task instructions
with the subjects and asked them to try doing the task and
think about how they might do on a task like this.

When all of

the subjects had finished the sample task the experimenter
handed out the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure,
labele~ Questionnaire 1 on the subject's copy,

and gave the

subjects the following instructions.
I am not going to tell you the right answers today
because you may see this same experiment or a similar
one later.
Pretend that you had been given a grade
and think about how well or how poorly you might have
done when you answer this set of questions. Read the

,---------------------------------
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instructions carefully before answering the questions.
The original instructions to the Locus of Control Scale
for Success-Failure as used by Epstein and Komorita.(1971) were
·slightly altered to fit the nature of the present study.

A

copy of the scale, scoring instructions, and the original
instructions used by Epstein and Komorita appear in Appendix
D.

The instructions used in the present study were as follows.
This task was performed by other children. After they
finished, some children found out they had done well
and others found out they had done poorly. When
these children were asked "why did you do well or
poorly?" they gave the following .reasons. As you
read each reason think about how well or how poorly
you would expect to do on this task. Then, show how
much you agree or disagree with the reason by circling the number which is closest to what you believe.
The fourteen item Locus of Control Scale for Success-

Failure was thus answered in direct relation to the subject's
perception of the sample task, and provided a measure of the
subject's control orientation to the experimental task prior
to the experimental manipulations.

A copy of this scale as

used for the pre-test appears in Appendix E.
When all subjects had finished the Locus of Control Scale
for Success-Failure, the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility
Questionnaire, labeled Questionnaire 2, on the subject's c9py,
was administered to all subjects.

This scale provided a more

generalized measure of the subject's control orientation, i.e.,
that of the academic achievement situation.

A copy of this

scale as used in the present study appears in Appendix C.
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of nine treat-
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ment groups, with six subjects in each group, prior to the
second experimental session.

Three of these groups received

skill oriented (personal control) instructions, three of the
groups received chance oriented (no personal control) instructions, and three groups received no specific instructions of
this kind.

The later three groups served as a control for the

skill-chance instruction manipulation.

These groups were

further designated to receive a particular type of task feedback, such that one of the groups receiving each of the three
modes of instruction received falsified success feedback,
one of each of the instruction groups received falsified
failure feedback, and one of each of the instruction groups
received no feedback.

The no feedback factor served as a con-

trol on the success-failure feedback manipulation.

This yielded

the following nine treatment combinations:
Skill (personal control) oriented instructions
Success feedback
Failure feedback
No feedback
Chance (no personal control) oriented instructions
Success feedback
Failure feedback
No feedback
No control oriented instructions
Success feedback
Failure feedback
No feedback
Each subject was seen individually for the second phase
of the experiment.

This session took place at least two weeks

after the first session.

Upon arriving for this session each

subject was asked to be seated at a large desk across from the
experimenter.

( 4 7.)

Each subject was given a set of instructions and asked
to read. them silently while the e·xperimenter read them aloud.
Each subject received the same task instructions as were given
for the sample task in the first experimental session.

Addi-

tionally, each subject was instructed that they would receive
three written descriptions of experiments and asked to hand
each back when they were finished so that the experimenter
could examine them.
The instructions from this point differed for the subjects
depending on which treatment group they had been randomly
assigned to.

The additional instructions for the three "skill"

oriented or personal control groups emphasized the logical
connection betwemthe described experiments and what was really
discovered in them, and that the subject's knowledge of people
would help them discover the "right" answers.

These instruc-

tions were intended to give the subject the impression that
personal skill or ability would be an important factor determining performance.

Subjects in the three chance-oriented or no

personal control groups received.additional instructions which
emphasized the lack of adequate information on which to base
decisions and that the subject's performance would depend largely
on guess-work.

These instructions were intended to give the

subject the impression that personal skill or ability was of
little importance and that the subject would have little personal
control over task performance.

The subjects assigned to the

remaining three groups received no additional instructions.
At the bottom of each instruction sheet were three questions
dealing with task motivation which were deemed necessary to
determine the validity of the experimental procedures.

Each

( 4 8.)

subject was asked to rate on a seven point scale how important
the task.was to him/her, how important it was to do well, and
how well the subject thought he/she would do.

A copy of each

of the three different instruction sheets appears in Appendices
I, J, and K, skill, chance, and no control orientation,
respectively.
Upon completing the instruction sheet each subject was
given the three task sheets one at a time.

Each of the three

task sheets contained a brief description of a fictitious experiment with ten possible results listed below.

As with

the sample task, the subject's task was to write TRUE in front
of the results they believed were actually found in that
experiment and FALSE in front of those they believed were not
found in the experiment.

Each subject received the three

task sheets in the same order, each sheet representing one
trial of the task.

The experimenter examined each task sheet

immediately after the subject was finished and handed it back
to the subject.

For those subjects in the three success condi-

tion groups the experimenter wrote 80% correct - very good,
90% correct - excellent, and 90% correct - excellent, at the
bottom of the task sheet for the three respective trials of
the task.

For those subjects in the three failure condition

groups the experimenter wrote 20% correct - poor, 10% correct very poor, and 10% correct - very poor, at the bottom of the
task sheet for the ·three respective trials of the task.

For

those subjects in the no-feedback condition groups the experimenter merely examined the answers and handed the task sheet
back to the subject.

A copy of each of the three
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task trials appears in Appendix L.
Irrunediately after completion of the task each subject was
again administered the Locus of Control Scale for SuccessFailure and the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility
Questionnaire, in that order.

Each subject was instructed

to answer the questions on both scales based on how they felt
"right now".

The instructions to the Locus of Control Scale

•

for Success-Failure were slightly altered to be in line with
the fact that the subject had completed the task situation.
Thus the sentence, "As you read each reason think about how
well or how poorly you would expect to do on this task", which
appeared in the pre-test instructions, was changed to, "As
you read each reason think about how well or how poorly you
think you did on this task", on the post-test instructions.
A copy of the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure with
the altered instructions as used in the post-test appears in
Appendix F.
Following all experimental procedures each subject was
given a standard debriefing sheet which the experimenter read
over with the subject.

This sheet explained the deceptions in

which the subject was involved and the true nature of the
research.
tions.

Each subject was given an opportunity to ask ques-

All subjects were asked not to discuss the study with

anyone else until completion of the data collection.

All

subjects were thanked for their participation in the research.
A copy of the debriefing sheet appears in Appendix N.
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C.

RESULTS

Analysis of Locus of Control Scores
A three factor, mixed analysis of variance with repeated
measures on one factor was used to test the effects of task
instruction (skill vs. chance vs. no control bias) and task
feedback (success vs. failure vs. no feedback) on trials of
I-E score.

Locus of control scores (I-E) were obtained both

before and after the experimental task manipulations, and
are represented by the repeated measures factor in the design.
A pictorial representation of the design appears in Figure 1.
Separate analyses as depicted in Figure 1 were performed
on the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure and the three
scores yielded by the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility
Questionnaire - r+ subscale, I- subscale, and total IAR score.
Each of these four analyses will be reported separately.
s 2 largest
Cochran's test (C=
was used to test for homogeniety
(s2

of variance.
1.

Analysis of Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure

Scores

Means and standard deviations for scores on the Locus of
Control Scale for Success-Failure are presented in Table 1,
Appendix 0.

The Cochran Test for homogeniety of variance

revealed no significant differences in variance among the
treatment groups (C= .2007;

C=.

951 91

ll= .2535).

Analysis

of the data revealed a significant trials X feerlbackinteraction
(F=G.275;

F _

951 21 45

=2.:'J9;

p <.005).

analysis appears in Table 2, Appendix
action appears in Figure 2.

O.

A summary of this
A graph of this inter-
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Figure 2. Trials X Feedback Interaction for Locus of
Control Scale for Success-Failure Scores
F-Tests were used to examine the simple effects of the significant trials X feedback interaction, and it was explored in
several ways.

First, the rate of change from pre to post-test-

ing of the three feedback groups compared two at a time was examined.

These analyses yielded a significant trials by groups

interaction for success versus failure feedback groups (F
F

95

(F

, l,

=

45

=

6.516; F

=

11.59;

4.06; p<..OOS) and for failure versus no feedback
95

, l,

45

=

4.06; p <.025}.

Sununaries of these analyses
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appear in Appendix

o,

Tables 3 and 5, respectively.

The

trials by· groups interaction was ·not significant when the
success and no feedback conditions were compared.

A sum-

mary of this analysis appears in Table 4 of Appendix O.
These analyses indicate that the failure condition resulted
in differential rates of change in I-E score when compared
to both the success and no feedback conditions, while the
change in I-E scores under the success condition was essentially
no different from that which occurred when subjects received
no performance feedback.
The change in I-E score from pre to post-testing was
also examined under each feedback condition separately.
failure condition resulted in a significant change (F
F. 95 , l, 45

=

=

The
12.72;

4.06) in an external direction (+4.21) while

no significant differences were found from pre to post-testing
for the success (-1.62) and no feedback conditions (-.05).
Summaries of these analyses for the success, failure, and no
feedback conditions appear in Appendix 0, Tables 6, 7, and 8,
respectively.
The simple effects for the original trials by feedback
interaction were lastly explored by examining the differences
among feedback groups at both the pre and post-testing.
There were no significant differences among the three feedback
groups on the pretest.
Table 9, Appendix O.

A summary of this analysis appears in
The analysis of the post-test I-E

scores for the three feedback groups demonstrated that there
were significant differences among the groups.
F

95

, 2 , 51 = 3.186).

(F

=

4.85;

A summary of this analysis appears in
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Table 10, Appendix O.

A Neuman-Keuls' Multiple Range Test

was used to test the differences among means for the three
feedback groups.
group

(X =

This analysis demonstrated that the failure

29.28) was significantly more external than the

success group

(X =

23.33) on the post-test.

Neither the success

group nor the failure group were significantly different from
the no feedback group

(X =

26.167).

A summary of this analysis

appears in Table 11, Appendix O.
2.

Analysis of the IAR Scores.
a.

Total I Score

Means and standard diviations for treatment groups on the
total I score are presented in Table 1, Appendix P.
The Cochran Test for homogeniety of variance was not
significant (C

= .1728;

c

. 2535) ' thus
.9 5' 9' 11 =
homogeniety of variance may be assumed.
The analysis
of the total I score revealed a significant trials
effect (F

=

5.04;

F •

951

l, 45

=

4.06) indicating an

overall change across treatment groups toward a more
internal orientation from the pre-test
to the post-test

(X =

26.759).

(X =

25.704)

A summary of this

analysis is presented in Table 2, Appendix P.
b.

I + Subscale

Means and standard deviations for treatment groups on
the I + subscale are presented in Table 1, Appendix Q.
The Cochran Test for homogeniety of variance was not
significant (C

= .2177;

c.95,9, 11 = .2535)' thus

homogeniety of variance can be assumed.

The analysis

(

.

., ., . )

of the IAR I + subscalc data revealed no significant
effects.

1\

Aiwendix

Q.

c.

I

summ.:iry of this .:inalysis appears in Table 2,

Subscale

Means and standard deviations for treatment groups on
the I

subscalc arc presented in Table 1, Appendix R.

The Cochran test for homogcnicty of variance was r.ot
significant (C

= .1746;

c. 95 ,

91 11

=

.2535), thu::;

hornogcnicty of variance can be assumed.
of the I

The analysi5

subscale score data revealed a significant

trials effect (F

=

7.819;

~

95 ,

1, 4 5

= 4. 06),

indic<it-

ing a significant shift toward a r.ore intcrn<il oricn-

•

tation from pre-test
across all groups.

ci =

12.352) to po::;t-test

ci =

13.185)

A su::-::lari' of this an.1lysis is pre-

sentcd in Table 2, Appendix R.
t\nalys is of Task Z·:ot i vat ion Oue:H ions
The subjects provided ratings on th rec t.l::;i-; r..oti v.1t ion
questions irn:::ediatcly after receiving the t.1sk instruction
questions and prior to taking part in the experimental ta::;k
situation and receiving pcrforr.ancc feedback.
were asked only once.

These question::;

A two factor ana!ysis of variance

(factorial design) was used to analyse the c!fcct::; of task
instruction (skill, chance, and no control orientation) and
pcrfor::-..1nce fcedb.1ck (success, failure,

.u~d

no !ccdbact:}

on subjects ratings for each of the three task
questions.
in Figure 3.

~otivat1on

A pictorial representation of the dcnign appears
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INSTROCTIONS
SKILL

Figure 3.

1.

CHANCE

NO COOTROL

Design for Analysis of Task Motivation Questions.

Task Motivation Question 1:

"How important is this

task to you?
Means and standard deviations for treatment groups on
subjects ratings of how important the task was to them appear
in Table 1, Appendix S.
C

95, 9, 5

=

.2042;

= .3286) permitted the assumption of homogeniety of

variance.
sults.

A nonsignificant Cochran Test (C

Analysis of the data revealed no significant re-

A summary of this analysis is presented in Table 2,

Appendix S.
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2.

Task Motivation Question 2:

How important is it

that you do well on this task?
Means and standard deviations for

t~eatment

groups on

subjects ratings of how important it was that they do well
on the task appear in Table I, Appendix T.
was not significant (C -

.1629;

C

.9 5 I

geniety of variance may be assumed.
significant results.

Table

5

9I

The Cochran Test

= .3286) , thus homo-

The analysis revealed no

2, Appendix T summarizes this

analysis.
3.

Task Motivation Question 3:

How well do you think

you will do on this task?
Means and standard deviations for treatment groups on
subjects ratings of how well they expected to do on the
task are presented in Table 1, Appendix
Cochran Test (C

=

.1730;

~

951

91

5

=

u.

A nonsignificant

.3286) indicated that

homogeniety of variance could be assumed.

The results of the

analysis revealed no significant results.

A summary of the

analysis is presented in Table 2, Appendix U.
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D.

DISCUSSION

The present investigation attempted to further explore
the effects of two variables which Allin (1978) hypothesized
as being important in influencing the modification of locus
of control.

These variables have been suggested in the

literature, but there has been a definite paucity of well
controlled studies designed to test their effects.
marily on

th~

Based pri-

work of Eisenman (1972) Allin predicted that

the experience of personal control (skill instructions) in a
task situation would lead to an increase in internal control,
while the experience of no personal control (chance instructions) would lead to an increase in external control.

Allin

further predicted that, based on studies by Sobel (1974) and
Andrisani and Nestel (1976), the experience of success would
lead to greater internal control while the experience of
failure would lead to greater external control.

The work of

Epstein and Komorita (1971) and Brecher and Denmark (1972) ,
not reviewed by Allin, also clearly support his hypotheses.
Since Allin's results demonstrated significant interaction
effects but failed to reveal any significant main effects by
the independent variables, further research was deemed necessary
to better understand the relationships among these variables.
The Rotter I-E scale, used in the Allin study, was intended to
be a broad gauge instrument and not designed to allow for high
prediction in specific situations (Rotter, 1975).

Soloman and

Oberlander (1974) state that "since a control orientation presumably develops out of a person's experiences in a variety of

(59.)

particular situations, and it is likely that for many individuals these experiences have been very different in different
kinds of situations, it is logical to expect that an individuals' control orientation in one class of situations may
be very different from what it is in another class of situations (p. 133) ."

The Rotter I-E scale has been widely

criticised because of its generality and multidimensionality
concerning three important parameters of control orientation:
1.

Generalization across persons (Gurin, et. al., 1969)
and across reinforcement areas (Mirels, 1970)

2.

Agents of external control (Hersch and Scheibe,
1967; Levenson, 1973 a, 1974).

3.

Types of reinforcement:

positive versus negative

(Crandall, et. al., 1965; Mischel, et. al., 1974).
It was the contention of the present study that differential
variance on any of these parameters could have obscured
Allin's results ..

The present study employed the Intellectual

Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire (Crandall, et. al.,
1965) to measure locus of control orientation.

The IAR was

designed to be specific to the academic achievement situation,
limit agents of external control to significant others in the
child's life, and assess control orientation for positive and
negative events separately.

In addition, following the reason-

ing of Soloman and Oberlander, a task specific measure of locus
of control, developed by Epstein and Komorita (1971) was used
in the present study to assess changes in control orientation
specific to the task situation.

The present study also con-

sidered the possibility that control orientation may undergo
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diffcrcnti<il :rodi!ic.-.tion with rcnpcct to tho

t\o"O

:wxcn.

Thus, in essence the present study wnu n rcplicntion of
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proposed to use a skill-chance rating scale as Allin did.
This was-deleted from the present study however, because
of its similarity to several items on the Locus of Control
Scale for

Success-Failure~

nine (see Appendix D) .

most noteably numbers six and

It was assumed that the task specific

Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure would replace the
skill-chance rating scale.

The analysis of this scale revealed

no significant effects for type of instruction, however.

The

only evidence to indicate that the skill chance biasing did
have some effect appeared in the anaiysis of the rating for
the task motivation question, "How well do you think you will
do on this task?"

This question was asked immediately after

the control biasing instructions were given.

The main effect

for instructions approached significance (p< .1).

The subjects

given skill instructions tended to have a higher expectancy
for success

(X

(X =

4.8), than those given chance instructions

= 4.2), while those subjects given neither skill nor chance

instructions tended to rate the question similar to the skill
instructed group.

These results must be interpreted with

extreme caution since the instructions X feedback interaction
also approached significance (p

< .1) ,

even though the question

had been asked prior to the time the subjects had actually
received differential performance feedback.
Eisenman (1972) using the Rotter I-E scale, found a
significant shift toward an external direction for subjects
given chance instructions, a significant shift toward a more
internal

orient~tion

for skill jnstructed subjects, and no
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significant change for the control group.
however,·were exposed to three

d~fferent

Eisenman's subjects,
situations in which

they experienced the skill or chance situation (3 verbal
conditioning experiments).

The subjects in the present study

received the instructions only once and took part in only
one task situation.

This suggests that it may take more than

one exposure to skill versus chance situations to significantly
effect control orientation.

Also, the subjects in both the

Allin and Eisenman studies were college students while the
subjects in the present study were middle school age children.
It is possible that these children were not able to understand
the implications of the skill-chance biasing in terms of
how much personal control they experienced in the situation.
The failure of the skill-chance instructions to result
in changes in subjects scores on the IAR may have been due to
the fact that the IAR limits agents of external control to
significant others in the child's life.

Thus, it is possible

that had a personal control - no personal control biasing of
subjects been effected by the skill-chance instructions, the
IAR would not have been sensitive to this dimension of control
orientation.
The results did provide some support for the hypothesis
concerning success versus failure performance feedback.

The

results of the analysis of the Locus of Control Scale for
Success-Failure were fairly clear.

Subjects experiencing failure

changed significantly toward a more external orientation and
subjects experiencing success tended to become more internal,

, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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although this was not significant.

The rate of change of the

failure group was also significantly different·from the no
feedback group, while the success group was not.

This indi-

cates the possibility that failure may be a more powerful
force in the child's life.

On the pre-test there were no

differences among the three feedback groups while on the
post-test the failure group was significantly more external
than the success group, while neither success nor failure
were significantly different from the no feedback group.
The rate of change of the success and failure groups was
also significantly different.

These results indicate that

performance feedback had important

effec~s

on the subjects

control orientation for the experimental task arid in the
directions predicted.

This occurred despite some weaknesses

noted in the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure.
The first nine items are worded in the positive direction and
the last five items are worded in the negative direction.

A

few of the subjects seemed to have difficulty adjusting to
this switch as there seemed to be a change in responding in
terms of control orientation that occurred at this point which
is difficult to explain otherwise.

It should be emphasized that

this is only conjecture on the part of the experimenter, and
at most occurred in only a very small minority of the subjects.
The results from the analysis of the IAR indicated no
significant effects in regard
experienced.

to type of performance feedback

This leaves unanswered the question as to how

changes in situational control, as are apparent from the

--------------~--------------------,
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analysis of the Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure,
generalize to the larger spheres of control orientation.

The

IAR, which Crandall developed as a more specific measure than
the Rotter I-E Scale, may itself be multidimensional.
In a recent study, Andrews and Debus (1978) found that
with the use of a task specific measure of causality attribution, clear results were indicated that temporal persistence
and resistance to extinction were found to be positively
related to attribution of failure to insufficient effort and
negatively related to attribution of failure to ability and
task difficulty, in line with their hypotheses.

The IAR,

however, showed only relatively "limited and weak relations
with persistence and with the attributional responses made
for success and failure experiences (p. 158)".

These authors

conclude that "the IAR may not be as suitable a measure of
attributional predispositions as has been apparently assumed

in many previous studies.

As a measure designed to apply to

achievement situations generally, the IAR may have limited
application in predicting attributional predisposition in a
specific task or situation.
findings solely on

Investigations that base their

attrib~ticnal

response~

measured by means of

the IAR perhaps should therefore be interpreted with cautiun,
und use of behavioral

mea~ures

should be preferred in future

attribution studies (pp. 163-164)".
The only significant finding
regard

in the present study with

to the IAR was a significant shift towards greater

internal control across all treatment groups on the I
and the total I score.

subscale

This finding may have been unique to
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the population studied.

The students at the two schools from

which subjects in the present study were drawn are almost
exclusively White and from upper middle class or above
families.

Several of the subjects in the failure condition

continued to think they had done poorly even after they were
debriefed and assured they hadn't really failed.

After being

thanked by the experimenter, two of the subjects apologized
for having done so poorly as they were leaving the room.
The experimenter assured these two that they really hadn't
done poorly.

Several of the teachers reported that students

had returned to class talking about how poorly they had done.
The results from the analysis of the task specific Locus of
Control Scale for Success-Failure indicated that failure may
be a very potent force for these children; and the experience
of failure or the fear of it may have been dealt with by
internalizing their failure experiences.
suggest the possibility that the I

These results also

subscale may be less

stable than the I+, contradictory to Crandall et. al.'s
(1965) data.
The evidence from the present study highlights the need
for a better understanding of just what the concept of locus of
control is and seriously questions the viability of a

general~

ized locus of control measure, even for a fairly specific
domain such as the academic achievement situation, which the
IAR purportedly measures.

At this point, much further research

is necessary before we can determine what dimensionsof control
orientation can be grouped together in a single scale.
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The present study also considered the possibility of
differential responding on the locus of control measures by
males and females.

A thorough examination of the data revealed

little difference among males and females in terms of their
rates of change from pre to post-testing, thus no post hoc
statistical tests were applied.
The importance of gaining a better understanding of
factors involved in the modification of locus of control is
most evident in the areas of psychotherapy and education.
Gaining a more internal control orientation is generally
considered to be of primary importance to the therapeutic
process (Lefcourt, 1972).

Externality has generally been

associated with poorer adjustment, higher anxiety, and less
positive affect states (Platt and Eisenman, 1968; Ray and
Katahn, 1968; Wareheim and Woodson, 1971; Watson, 1967).
The locus of control literature has also demonstrated that
the development of internal control leads to increases in
information seeking, and information utilization (Crandall,
1970; Davis and Phares, 1967; Phares, 1969; Lefcourt, 1967).
In light of these studies, a knowledge of what factors bring
about an increase in internal control may be crucial to
education.

Stevens (:'172) believes that there may be a re-

ciprocal relationship between intelligence and locus of control,
that is, not only does intelligence mediate internal-external
control orientation, but also internal-external control orientation effects the development of intelligence.
The value of an internal control orientation has been
espoused throughout the locus of control literature.

The
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present study, however, also explored the factors which may
be involved in bringing about

gr~ater

external control.

The

importance of a better understanding of these factors is less
obvious.

The finding by DuCuette, et. al.

(1972) that mal-

adjustment in their sample was due to a lack of homogeniety
between control orientations for positive and negative events
points in this direction.

Therapeutic intervention could thus

involve increasing either internal or external control depending on the nature of the relationship between control expectancies for positive and negative events within the individual.
Rotter (1966)

suggested that the relationship between I-E

scores and maladjustment is likely not a linear one but that
extremes in either direction would theoretically lead to difficulties.

Gurin and Gurin (1970), from their studies with

disadvantaged persons, conclude that, "Clearly, the problem of
learning new expectancies is no longer one of changing from an
external to an internal orientation.

Rather, poor people are

presented with the much more difficult problem of learning to
make very complex judgements as to when an internal orientation
reflects intrapunitiveness rather than a sense of efficacy,
when an external orientation becomes defensive rather than a
realistic blaming of the social system.

Moreover, these

judgements must be made at a time when objective opportunities
are in flux, making an accurate picture of reality all the
more difficult (p. 104)".
It is pertinent at this point to mention Lefcourt's
(1976) caution against viewing locus of control as a personality
trait, as if it were a possession of the individual.

Lefcourt

(68.)

argues that the stability and change which are evidenced in the
locus of· control literature only make sense if individuals are
sald to construct events, some of which pertain to causality,
rather than that they have a locus of control trait or are
internals or externals.

The evidence which has been presented

which questions the viability of locus of control as unidimensional also supports this contention.

In light of this data,

we would have to speak of locus of control traits for each
factor or dimension such as academic achievement, interpersonal relations, physical areas; etc.

At present our lack of

knowledge about how locus of control generalizes from situation
to situation makes it absurd to conceptualize a locus of control trait.

The present study, then was not an attempt to

modify a personality characteristic or trait, but rather an
investigation designed to examine how specific control expectancies might change within a specific situation, the task
itself and the academic achievement situation.

The present study

provides evidence that performance feedback is an important
factor in modifying control orientation for a very specific
situation, but how this generalizes to larger domains, such
as academic achievement is left unanswered.
The present study also examined motivational variables
that the literature indicated might effect the modification
of locus of control.
The value of the task for an individual subject and their
motivation to do well might effect the results.

Naditch

found that there was a significant correlation between

(1973)
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internal-external control orientation and three areas of competance (school achievement, sports achievement, and social
popularity) with male subjects, only for those subjects who
indicated that these areas were important to them.

The

subjects were asked to answer two questions pertaining to the
value they placed on the task:
you?"

"How important is this task to

and "How important is it that you do well on this task?"

Subjects were also asked to indicate how well they expected
to do on the task, since this factor may have important effects
on control orientation (Gurin and Gurin, 1970).

For instance,

a person expecting to do well might react differently to
success than a person expecting to do poorly.

Allin (1978)

asked his subjects to provide ratings on these three questions
immediately after they received the task instructions.

Allin

analysed these results in a two factor design, task instructions
(skill versus chance) and performance feedback (success versus
failure versus no feedback).
(a)

His results indicated that:

the subjects did not differ in terms of the importance

they placed on the task,

(b)

skill instructed subjects indi-

cated that it was more important that they do well than chance
instructed subjects,

(c)

the success feedback group had a

higher expectation for doing well than the no feedback group.
The results of the analysis of the three task motivation questions in the present study revealed no significant results,
except for the trends already discussed for the question
pertaining to the subjects' expectancy for doing well.

The

most viable explanation for the lack of significance with
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regard to the task motivation questions is that the skillchance instructions were not effective with the children
used as subjects in the present study as was discussed with
regard

to their responses to the locus of control measures.

Several other subject variables not specifically addressed
in the present study which the literature indicates might have
effects on the modification of locus of control provide
interesting possibilities for future research.
Class, race, and cultural differences in locus of control
orientation have been well documented in the literature.
et. al. 's (1969)

Gurin,

finding that it is externality in Blacks that

was related to more socially active coping measures is particularly relevant to the present study.

It may be that various

social and ethnic group members in the sample would react
differently to the independent variables in terms of shifts
in control orientation.

Although this factor was not specifically

controlled for in the present study, it has been shown that
the IAR is relatively insensitive to differences in social
class and ethnic group (Solomon, Houlihan, and Parelius, 1969).
Crandall, et. al.

(1965) suggested that the more general scales

such as the Rotter I-E may show race and class differences
while the IAR does not because the former "refer to broad and
nonspecific situations in the general environment where there
are real differences in the power of members of different
social strata to exert effective influence, while the IAR refers
to school situations where teachers exhortations about responsibility and reinforcement contingencies for achievement efforts
are the same for children from different social strata (p. 104) ."

(71.)

Random sampling was relied upon to control for several
other factors which previous research has demonstrated to be
important to locus of control orientation as it was explored
in the present study.

The most widely investigated of these

factors has been the differential responding of individuals
classified as internals and externals.

The research has

indicated that there are differences in subjects grouped as
internals versus externals with respect to attribution of
responsibility for success and failure (Davis and Davis, 1972;
Lefcourt, Hogg, Struthers, and Holmes, 1975; Gilmore and Minton,
1974; Kaiser, 1975; Kroventz, 1974), changes in confidence
levels after experiences of success or failure (Feather, 1968;
Ryckman, Gold, and Rhodda, 1971; Ryckman and Rhodda, 1971),
reactions to threat or defensiveness (Phares and Lamiell,
1974; Phares,Ritchie, and Davis, 1968; Phares, 1971), sensitivity to environmental stimuli (DuCette and. Wolk, 1973),
response to intrinsic versus extrinsic feedback (Baron, et. al.,
1974), and performance under skill and chance conditions (Watson
and Baurnal, 1967).

The present study made no attempt to

differentiate between internals and externals.

There is little

consensus in these studies as to how to differentiate between
internals and externals.
Random sampling was also relied on to control for subject
differences in need achievement and self esteem.
Kuckla (1970)

Weiner and

found that individuals high in need achievement

tend to accept responsibility for their success but not their
failures, while no such relationship was evident for persons
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low in need achievement.

Epstein and Komorita (1971) found

that it was the individuals who were in the mid range on a
self esteem measure who differed most on the locus of control
scale with respect to success-failure experiences.

Task

difficulty (Weiner and Kuckla, 1970) ,degree of success or
failure (Kroventz, 1974), and degree of past

succ~ssful

experience (Lefcourt and Ladwig, 1965 b) have also been suggested as important factors in control orientation.
The present research has indicated that subjects may
change their control orientation in a specific situation without effecting their control orientation for a more generalized
domain.

Future research would do well to concentrate on more

clearly defining the parameters of locus of control modif ication in specific situations and examining more closely how
changes in control orientation in one dimension effect control
orientation in another.

Rubner (1975) developed the Situational

Locus of Responsibility (SLR) Inventory which he believes
"will permit examining of the situational multidimensionality
of the I-E construct (p. 4259)".

The SLR was constructed for

use with seventh to twelfth grade pupils.

It consists of

three, twenty-four item scales, each offering common experiences
involving friends, school and family respectively.

Each of the

three subscales contains positive and negative experiences.
"The subject is asked first to decide whether'the experience
is 'within' or 'beyond' his or her control and then how much
within or beyond his control it is by distributing five points
as either 5 - O (completely within) , 4 - 1 (mostly within} ,

,( 7 3. )

3 - 2 (slightly within), 2 - 3 (slightly beyond), 1 - 4
(mostly beyond), or 0 - 5 (completely beyond)

(p. 4260) ".

This scale has received little attention but its format
offers interesting possibilities for the examination of
situational control orientation ln a wide variety of areas.

(7'1.)

APPENDIX A

The Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale
and Scoring Instructions
The Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale is a
23-item forced choice questionnaire with six filler items.
It
is scored in the external direction.
I more strongly believe that:
1.

a.
b.

E

2.

a.
b.

3.

b.

E

4.

a.
b.

E

5.

a.
b.

E

E

a.

6.

a.
b.

E

7.

a.
b.

8.

a.
b.

Children get into trouble because their parents
punish them too much.
The trouble with most children nowadays is that
their parents are too easy with them.
Many of the unhappy things in people's lives
are partly due to bad luck.
People's misfortunes result from the mistakes
they make.
One of the major reasons why we have wars is
because people don't take enough interest in
politics.
There will always be wars, no matter how hard
people try to prevent them.
In the long run people get the respect they
deserve in this world.
Unfortunately, an individual's worth often
passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.
The idea that teachers are unfair to students
is nonsense.
Most students don't realize the extent to which
their grades are influenced by accidental
happenings.
Without the right breaks one cannot be an
effective leader.
Capable people who fail to become leaders have
not taken advantage of their opportunities.
No matter how hard you try some people just
don't like you.
People who can't get others to like them don't
understand how to get along with others.
Heredity plays the major role in determining
one's personality.
It is one's experiences in life which determine
what they're like.
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E

9.

a.
b.

10.

a.
b.

E

11.

a.
b.

E

12.

a.
b.

E

13.
E

14.

a.

E

16.

17.

18.

19.

The average citizen can have an influence in
government decisions.
This world is run by the few people in t>ow~r,
and there is not much the little guy can do
about it.

There arc certain people who .1rc junt no <;ood.
There is sorr.e good in everybody.

a.

a.

a.
b.

E

is a matter of hard work,
nothing to do with it.
depends mainly on being in
the right time.

a.

b.
E

Becoming a success
luck has little or
Getting a good job
the right place at

b.

b.

E

In the case of the well prepared student there
is rarely if ever such a thing as nn unfair test.
Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really
useless.

When I r:hlke plans, I .ll':l cllrnost certain tlh1t I
can make them work.
It is not alwayn wise to pl.1n too far ;ihcad
because m.1ny things turn out to be a r:l.ltter
of good or bad fortune anyhow.

-b.

15.

I have often fo·md that what h; going to
happen will happen.
Trusting to fate has never turned out as well
for me as making a decision to take a dcf initc
course of action.

a.

In my case getting wh~t I want ha5 little or
ncthing to do with luck.
Many times we might junt as well decide what
to do by flipping a coin.
Who gets to be the boss often depcndc on wr.o
was lucky enough to be in the right place f ir5t.
Getting people to do the right thing dcpc~d5 upon
ability~ luck has little or nothing to do with it.
As far as world affairs arc concerned, ~o5t of
us arc the victi~s o! !orces we can neither
understand, nor control.
Dy taking an actn·c part in political .1nd social
affairs the people can control world cvcnt5.
~est

b.

people can't realize the extent to which
their lives arc controlled by accidental happenings.
There rcall7 is no such thing as "luc~".

a.

one should always be willing to ad~it his ~istakes.

--b.

It is usually best to cover up one's

~ista>;cs.
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E

20.

a.
·b.

E

21.

a.
b.

22.

E
E

a.
b.

23.

a.
b.

24.

a.
b.

E

25.

a.
b.

26.

a.
b.

E
27.

a.
b.

28.

E

a.
~-b.

E
29.

a.
b.

It is hard to know whether or not a person
really likes you.
How many friends you have depends upon how
nice a person you are.
In the long run the bad things that happen to
us are balanced by the good ones.
Most misfortunes are the result of lack of
ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.
With enough effort we can wipe out political
corruption.
It is difficult for people to have much control
over the things politicians do in office.
Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive
at the grades they give.
There is a direct connection between how hard I
study and the grades I get.
A good leader expects people to decide for
themselves what they should do.
A good leader makes it clear to everybody what
their jobs are.
Many times I feel that I have little influence
over the things that happen to me.
It is impossible for me to believe that chance
or luck plays an important role in my life.
People are lonely because they don't try to be
friendly.
There's not much use in trying too hard to
please people, if they like you, they like you.
There is too much emphasis on athletics in
high school.
Team sports are an excellent way to build
character.
What happens to me is my own doing.
Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough
control over the direction my life is taking.
Most of the time I can't understand why politicians
behave the way they do.
In the long run the people are responsible for
bad government on a national as well as on a
local level.
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APPENDIX B
The Crandall Intellectual Achievement Responsibility
Questionnaire and Scoring Instructions
Internal alternatives are denoted by an I and the test
is scored in an internal direction. Positive-events items are
indicated by a plus sign, and+negative events by a minus sign
following the I. A child's I
score is the sum of all po~itive
events for which he assumes credit, and his I- score is the sum
of all n~gative events for 'fhich h§ assumes blame.
The total
I score is the sum of the I
and I
subscales.
The IAR Scale
1.

If a teacher passes you to the next grade, would it
probably be
(a)
because she liked you, or
(b)
because of the work you did?

2.

When you do well in a test at school, is it more
likely to be
(a)
because you studied for it, or
(b)
because the test was especially easy?

3.

When you have trouble understanding something in
school, is it usually
(a)
becaus~ the teacher didn't explain it clearly, or
(b)
because you didn't listen carefully?

4.

When you read a story and can't remember much of it,
is it usually
·(a)
because the story wasn't well written, or
(b)
because you weren't interested in the story?

I+

I+

I

I
5.

Suppose your
Is it likely
(a)
because
(b)
because

6.

Suppose you did better than usual in a subject at
school. Would it probably happen
(a)
because you tried harder, or
(b)
because someone helped you?

7.

When you lose at a game of cards or checkers, does
it usually happen
(a)
because the other player is good at the game, or
(b)
because you don't play well?

8.

Suppose a person doesn't think you are very bright
or clever.
(a)
Can you make him change his mind if you try to, or
(b)
are there some people who will think you're not
very bright no matter what you do?

I+

I+

I

I

parents say you are doing well in school.
to happen
your school work is good, or
they are in a good mood?
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9.

I+
10.

If a boy or girl tells you that you are dumb, is
it more likely that they say that
(a)
because they are mad at you, or
(b)
because what you did really wasn't very bright?

11.

Suppose you study to become a teacher, scientist, or
doctor and you fail.
Do you think this would happen
(a)
because you didn't work hard enough, or
(b)
because you needed some help and other people
didn't give it to you?

12.

When you learn something quickly in school, is
it usually
(a)
because you paid close attention, or
(b)
because the teacher explained it clearly?

13.

If a teacher says to you, "Your work is fine," is
it
(a)
something teachers usually say to encourage
pupils, or
(b)
because you did a good job?

14.

When you find it hard to work arithmetic or math
problems at school, is it
(a)
because you didn't study well enough before you
tried them, or
(b)
because the teacher gave problems that were too
hard?

15.

When you forget 'something you heard in class, is
it
(a)
because the teacher didn't explain it very well, or
because you didn't try very hard to remember?
(b)

16.

Suppose you weren't sure about the answer to a question
your teacher asked you, but your answer turned out
to be right.
Is it likely to happen
(a)
because she wasn't as particular as usual, or
(b)
because you gave the best answer you could think of?

17.

When you read a story and remember most of it, is it
usually
,
(a)
because you were interested in the story, or
(b)
because the story was well written?

18.

If your parents tell you you're acting silly and not
thinking clearly, is it more likely to be
(a)
because of something you did, or
(b)
because they happen to be feeling cranky?

I

I

I

I

I

If you solve a puzzle quickly, is it
(a)
because it wasn't a very hard puzzle, or
(b)
because you worked on it carefully?
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19.

When you don't do well on a test at school, is it
(a)
because the test was especially hard, or
(b)
because you didn't study for it?

20.

When you win at a game of cards or checkers, does
it happen
(a)
because you play real well, or
(b)
because the other person doesn't play well?

21.

If people think you're bright or clever, is it
(a)
because they happen to like you, or
(b)
because you usually act that way?

22.

If a teacher didn't pass you to the next grade,
would it probably be
(a)
because she "had it in for you," or
(b)
because your school work wasn't good enough?

23.

Suppose you don't do as well as usual in a subject at
school. Would this probably happen
(a)
because you weren't as careful as usual, or
(b)
because somebody bothered you and kept you from
working?

24.

If a boy or girl tells you that you are bright, is
it usually
(a)
because you thought up a good idea, or
(b)
because they like you?

25.

Suppose you become a famous teacher, scientist, or
doctor.
Do you think this would happen

I

I+

I

I

I

(a)
(b)

because other people helped you when you needed
it, or
because you worked hard?

26.

Suppose your parents say you aren't doing well in
your school work.
Is this likely to happen more
(a)
because your work isn't very good, or
(b)
because they are feeling cranky?

27.

Suppose you are showing a friend how to play a game
and he has trouble with it. Would that happen
(a)
because he wasn't able to understand how to
play, or
(b)
because you couldn't explain it well?
'
When you find it easy to work arithmetic or math
problems at school, it is usually
(a)
because the teacher gave you especially easy
problems, or
(b)
because you studied your book well before you
tried them?

I

I

28.

(UO.)

29.

When you remember something you heard in class, is
it usually
(a)
becau~e you tried hard to remember, or
(b)
because the teacher explained it well?

30.

If you can't work a puzzle, is it more likely to
happen
(a)
because you are not especially good at working
puzzles, or
(b)
because the instructions weren't written clearly
enough?

31.

If your parents tell you that you are bright or
cleaver, is it more likely
(a)
because they are feeling good, or
(b)
because of something you did?

32.

Suppose you are explaining how to play a game to a
Would that happen more
friend and he learns quickly.
of ten
(a)
because you explained it well, or
because he was able to understand it?
(b)

33.

Suppose you're not sure about the answer to a
question your teacher asks you and the answer you
give turns out to be wrong.
Is it likely to happen
(a)
because she was more particular than usual, or
(b)
because you answered too quickly?

34.

If a teacher says to you, "Try to do better," would
it be
(a)
because this is something she might say to get
pupils to try harder, or
because your work wasn't as good as usual?
(b)

I

I

I
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APPENDIX C
The IAR and Instructions as Used in the Present Study
QUESTIONNAIRE 2
This questionnaire describes a number of common experiences
most of you have in your daily lives.
These statements are
presented one at a time, and following each are two possible
answers.
Read the description of the experience carefully,
and then look at the two answers.
Choose the one that most
often describes what happens to you.
Put a circle around the
"A" or "B" in front of that answer.
Be sure to answer each
question according to how you really feel.
If, at any time you are uncertain about the meaning of a
question, raise your hand and the person who passed out the
questionnaires will come and explain it to you.
1.

If a teacher passes you to the next grade, would it probably
be
{a)
because she liked you, or
{b)
because of the work you did?

2.

When you do well on a test at school, is it more likely to
be
{a)
because you studied for it, or
because the test was especially easy?
{b)

3.

When you have trouble understanding something in school,
is it usually
{a)
because the teacher didn't explain it clearly, or
{b)
because you didn't listen carefully?

4.

When you read a story and can't remember much of it, is
it usually
{a)
because the story wasn't well written, or
{b)
because you weren't interested in the story?

5.

Suppose your
Is it likely
{a)
because
(b)
because

6.

Suppose you did better than usual in a subject at school.
Would it probably happen
(a)
because you tried harder, or
(b)
because someone helped you?

7.

When you lose at a game of cards or checkers, does it
usually happen
{a)
because the other player is good at the game, or
{b)
because you don't play well?

parents say you are doing well in school.
to happen
your school work is good, or
they are in a good mood?
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8.

Suppose a person doesn't think you are very bright or
clever.
{a)
can you make him change his mind if you try to, or
{b)
are there some people who will think you're not very
bright no matter what you do?

9.

If you solve a puzzle quickly, is it
(a)
because it wasn't a very hard puzzle, or
{b)
because you worked on it carefully?

10.

If a boy or girl tells you that you are dumb, is it more
likely that they say that
(a)
because they are mad at you, or
(b)
because what you did really wasn't very bright?

11.

Suppose you study to become a teacher, scientist, or
doctor and you fail.
Do you think this would happen
{a)
because you didn't work hard enough, or
{b)
because you needed some help and other people
didn't give it to you?

12.

When you learn something quickly in school, is it usually
(a)
because you paid close attention, or
(b)
because the teacher explained it clearly?

13.

If a teacher says to you, "Your work is fine," is it
(a)
something teachers usually say to encourage pupils,
or
{b)
because you did a good job?

14.

When you find it
at school, is it
(a)
because you
tried them,
(b)
because the

hard to work arithmetic or math problems
didn't study well enough before you
or
teacher gave problems that were too hard?

15.

When you forget something you heard in class, is it
(a)
because the teacher didn't explain it very well, or
(b)
because you didn't try very hard to remember?

16.

Suppose you weren't sure about the answer to a question
your teacher asked you, but your answer turned out to be
right.
Is it likely to happen
(a)
because she wasn't as particular as usual, or
(b)
because you gave the best answer you could think of?

17.

When you read a story and remember most of· it, is it
usually
(a)
because you were interested in the story, or
(b)
because the story was well written?
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18.

If your parents tell you you're acting silly and not
thinking clearly, is it more likely to be
(a)
because of something you-did, or
(b)
because they happen to be feeling cranky?

19.

When you don't do well on a test at school, is it
(a)
because the test was especially hard, or
(b)
because you didn't study for it?

20.

When you win at a game of cards or checkers, does it
happen
(a)
because you play real well, or
(b)
because the other person doesn't play well?

21.

If people think you're bright or clever, is it
(a)
because they happen to like you, or
(b)
because you usually act that way?

22.

If a teacher didn't pass you to the next grade, would it
probably be
(a)
because she "had it in for you," or
(b)
because your school work wasn't good enough?

23.

Suppose you don't do as well as usual in a subject at
school. Would this probably happen
(a)
because you weren't as careful as usual, or
(b)
because somebody bothered you and kept you from
working?

24.

If a boy or girl tells you that you are bright, is it
usually
(a)
because you thought up a good idea, or
(b)
because they like you?

25.

Suppose you became a famous teacher, scientist, or doctor.
Do you think this would happen
(a)
because other people helped you when you needed it,or
(b)
because you worked hard?

26.

Suppose your parents say you aren't doing well in your
Is this likely to happen more
school work.
(a)
because your work isn't very good, or
(b)
because they are feeling cranky?

27.

Suppose you are showing a friend how to play a game and he
has trouble with it. Would that happen
(a)
because he wasn't able to understand how to play, or
(b)
because you couldn't explain it well?

28.

When you find it
at school, is it
(a)
because the
(b)
because you

easy to work arithmetic or math problems
usually
teacher gave you especially easy problems, or
studied your book well before you tried them?
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29.

When you remember something you heard in class, is it usually
(a)
because you tried hard to remember, or.
(b)
because the teacher explained it well?

30.

If you can't work a puzzle, is it more likely to happen
(a)
because you are not especially good at working
puzzles, or
(b)
because the instructions weren't written clearly enough?

31.

If your parents tell you that you are bright or clever, is
it more likely
(a)
because they are feeling good, or
(b)
because of something you did?

32.

Suppose you are explaining how to play a game to a friend
and he learns quickly. Would that happen more often
(a)
because you explained it well, or
(b)
because he was able to understand it?

33.

Suppose you're not sure about the answer to a question
your teacher asks you and the answer you giv~ turns out
to be wrong.
Is it likely to happen
(a)
because she was more particular than usual, or
(b)
because you answered too quickly?

34.

If a teacher says to you, "Try to do better," would it be
(a)
because this is something she might say to get pupils
to try harder, or
(b)
because your work wasn't as good as usual?

,-( 8 5. )

APPENDIX D

Epstein and Komorita's
Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure
Scoring Instructions
This scale consists of 14 items to which the subject
indicates his agreement or disagreement on a 4-point scale
(from "very much agree" to "very much disagree"). Scoring
consists of differentially weighting the alternatives of each
item in the direction of external control. An I before the
item indicates that agreement with the statement is internal
control. An E before the item indicates that agreement with
the statement is external control. The instructions ask the
child to answer the items in direct relation to his performance on the task. The stems of the items are the following:
I

1.

It depends on how carefully you work.

I

2.

It depends on how much confidence you have in yourself.

E

3.

It depends on whet.her thP. person testing you likes you
or does not like you.

E

4.

It depends on whether you feel well or not well.

I

5.

It depends on how much hope you have.

I

6.

It depends on how much good or bad luck you have.

I

7.

It depends on how alert you are during the game.

I

8.

It depends on how much you care about the game.

I

9.

It depends on how much ability you have.

E

10.

It does not depend on how carefully you work.

E

11.

It does not depend on how much you believe you will
do well.

E

12.

It has nothing to do with how much you pay attention
to the game (task).

E

13.

It does not depend on how much you think about the game.

E

14.

It does not depend on how well you understand the game.

Instructions used by Epstein and Komorita (197~ were the
following:
Thisgame has been played by other children. After they
played, some children found out they had done well and
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others found out they had done poorly. When these
children were asked "why did you do well or poorly?"
they gave the following reasons. As you read each
reason, remember whether you did well or poorly.
Then, show how much you agree or disagree with the
reason.

~--

( U7.)

APPE?H>IX E
The Locus of Control Scale for Success-failure
As Used for the Pre-Test
QUEST I om:,\ I RE 1
This task was performed by other children. After they
finished, some children found out they had done well and
others found out they had done poorly. When thcne children
were asked "Why did you do well or poorly?" they g.·wc the
following reasons. As you read each reason think about how
well or how poorly you would expect to do on thin task. Then,
show how much you agree or disagree with the rcaoon by circling
the number which is closest to what you believe.
1.

It depends on how carefully you work.
.;
(very much agree) 1
2
3

(very much dicagrcc)

2.

It depends on how much conf idcncc you have in yourself.
.;
(very much di n<1g rec)
(very much agree) 1
2
3

3.

It depends on whether the person testing you likea you
or does not like you.
.;
(very l':l.UCh dii:;.1grec)
2
3
(very much agree) 1

4.

It depends en whether you feel well or not .,,,.c 11.
(very r:';UCh di::i.19rcc)
2
3
4
(very much agree) 1

s.

It depends on how r:mch hope you have.
2
3
4
(very much agree) 1

6.

It depends on hO"... r.:uch good or b.id luck you h,l\'C.
•
(very r.iUCh c! i :rn c; r cc)
2
3
(very much agree) 1

7.

It depends on how alert you arc
2
3
(very much agree) 1

8.

It depends on how r:iuch you care <lbout the t.1nJ.:.
(•;cry ~uch <.! i 1;.19 rec)
4
2
3
(very much agree) 1

9.

It depends on how r::uch ability
3
2
(very r:iUCh agree) 1

..
during
.•

j'Oi.l

It docs not depend on ho..,. carcfullj•
4
3
2
(very r:iUch agree) 1

11.

It docs not depend on ho·,:
2
(very r.iuch agree) 1

12.

It has nothing to do with ho·..· r.-uch you
task.

(very much agree)

1

2

3

3

the t.1of:.
(very r.:uch din.lgrcc)

.•have.(very

10.

r"~UC!l

{very l':l.UCh dir;.1grce)

~·ou

r.:uch din.lgrcc)

•..:ori:.

(very r.:uch din.igrcc)

you believe :;ou •..· i 11 do .,..cl 1.
•
(very r:.uch di5.JCj!."CC)

..

..'

pilj'

attention to the

(,:cr~l

r.uch dis.igrc!!)
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13.

It does not depend on how much you think about the task.
(very much agree} 1
2
3
4
(very much disagree}

14.

It does not depend on how well you understand the task.
(very much agree) 1
2
3
4
(very much disagree)

( 8 9.)

APPENDIX F
The Locus of Control Scale for Success-Failure
As Used for the Post-Test
QUESTIONNAIRE 1
This task was performed by other children. After they
finished, some children found out they had done well and others
found out they had done poorly. When these children were asked
"Why did you do well or poorly?" they gave the following reasons.
As you read each reason think about how well or how poorly you
think you did on this task.
Then, show how much you agree
or disagree with the reason by circling the number which is
closest to what you believe.
1.

It depends on how carefully you work.
2
(very much agree)
1
3
4

(very much disagree)

2.

It depends on how much confidence you have in yourself.
2
(very much disagree)
3
4
(very much agree)
1

3.

It depends on whether the person testing you likes you or
does not like you.
2
4
(very much disagree)
1
3
(very much agree)

4.

It depends on whether you feel well or not well.
(very much disagree)
2
3
4
1
(very much agree)

5.

It depends on how much hope you have.
2
3
4
1
(very much agree)

'(very much disagree)

6.

It depends on how much good or bad luck you have.
(very much disagree)
2
3
4
1
(very much agree)

7.

It depends on how alert you are during the task.
(very much disagree)
2
4
3
1
(very much agree)

8.

It depends on how much you care about the task.
(very much disagree)
2
3
4
1
(very much agree)

9.

It depends on how much ability you have.
4
2
3
1
(very much agree)

(very much disagree)

10.

It does not depend on how carefully you work.
2
3
4
Cv,ery much disagree)
1
(very much agree)

11.

It does not depend on how much you believe you will do well.
(very much disagree)
4
2
3
1
(very much agree)

12.

It has nothing to do with how much you pay attention to the tas
(very much disagree)
4
2
3
1
(very much agree)

13.

It does not depend on how much you think about the task.
(very much disagree)
2
3
4
1
(very much agree)

14.

It does not depend on how well you understand the task.
(very much disagree)
2
3
4
1
(very much agree)

( 9 u.
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APPENDIX G
Sample Task
This experiment studied what people do when they see
someone hurt.

It was done in the downtown area of a big city

where there were a lot of people walking by.

The person doing

the experiment had one of his helpers make believe they fell
down and then they cried out for help.

This person was called

the victim, and sometimes a man was used and sometimes a woman.
Some people stopped to help and some just walked by.

The

experimenter asked these people to come to his off ice to
talk to him and take tests to measure how smart they were,
their fearfulness, and their confidence in themselves.

After

doing this 25 times, the person doing the experiment discovered
that:

- - -1.

More people stopped to help when the victim was a woman.

- - -2.

The people who stopped were smarter than those who
just walked by.

3.

The main reason people gave for why they stopped to help
was that they would want someone to help them if they
were hurt.

4.

More women stopped to help than men.

5.

The average age of the people who stopped to help
was younger than those who passed by.

6.

The people who walked by were more fearful than those
who stopped to help.

7.

When the victim was a man, more women stopped to help
than men.

8.

The main reason people gave for not stopping was that
they were afraid to get involved.

9.

The people who stopped to help were more confident.

---

---

---

10.

Most of the people who stopped to help were or had
been members of the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts.
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APPENDIX H
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SAMPLE TASK
Read the experiment very carefully.

Below the experiment

are listed ten things that might have been discovered in the
experiment.

Your task is to decide which of the ten things

really were discovered in the experiment and which were not.
Write TRUE in the space in front of the statement if you think
that it really was discovered in the experiment.

Write FALSE

in the space in front of the statement if you think that it
was not found in the

experiment~

of true or false statements.

There could be any number

(92.)

APPENDIX I
Skill (Personal Control) Oriented Instruction Sheet
Read the experiment very carefully.

Below the experiment

are listed ten things that might have been discovered in the
experiment.

Your task is to decide which of the ten things

really were discovered in the experiment and which were not.
Write TRUE in the space in front of the statement if you think
that it really was discovered in the experiment.

Write FALSE

in the space in front of the statement if you think that it
was not found in the experimeni.

There could be any number

of true or false statements.
You will be given three experiments.

Please hand each back

to me when you are finished so that I may examine it.
Based on what you know about people you should be able
to figure out what was really discovered in these experiments
and what was not.

There are connections between the experiments

and what was really discovered in them which make sense if
you can figure them out.
Before going on, please answer the following questions.
1.

How important is this task to you?
(NOT IMPORTANT) l
2 3 4 5 6 7 (IMPORTANT)

2.

How important is it that you do well on this task?
(NOT IMPORTANT) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (IMPORTANT)

3.

How well do you think you will do on this task?
(VERY POORLY)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (VERY WELL)
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APPENDIX J
Chance {No Personal Control) Oriented Instruction Sheet
Read the experiment very carefully.

Below the experiment

are listed ten things that might have been discovered in the
experiment.

Your task is to decide which of the ten things

really were discovered in the experiment and which were not.
Write TRUE in the space in front of the statement if you think
that it really was discovered in the experiment.

Write FALSE

in the space in front of the statement if you think that it
was not found in the experiment.

There could be any number

of true or false statements.
You will be given three experiments.

Please hand each back

to me when you are finished so that I may examine it.
You have little to base your decisions on in this task.
The connections between the experiments and what was really
discovered in them don't always make sense.

How well you do

on this task is a matter of guess-work.
Before going on, please answer the following questions.
1.

How important is this task to you?
(NOT IMPORTANT)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(IMPORTANT)

2.

How important is it that you do well on this task?
(NOT IMPORTANT)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (IMPORTANT)

3.

How well do you think you will do on this task?
(VERY POORLY)
1 2 3 4 5 h 7 (VERY WELL)
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APPENDIX K
No Control Orientation Biased Instruction Sheet
Read the experiment very carefully.
are listed ten things that might have
experimPnt.

be~n

Below the experiment
discovered in the

Your task is to decide which of the ten things

really were discovered in the experiment and which were not.
Write TRUE in the space in front of the statement if you think
that it really was discovered in the experiment.

Write FALSE

in the space in front of the statement if you think that it
was not found in the experiment.

There could be any number

of true or false statements.
You will be given three experiments.

Please hand each

back to me when you are finished so that I may examine it.
Before going on, please answer the following questions.
1.

How important is this task to you?
(NOT IMPORTANT)

2.

2

3

4

5

6

7 (IMPORTANT)

How important is it that you do well on this task?
(NOT IMPORTANT)

3.

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 (IMPORTANT)

How well do you think you will do on this task?
(VERY POORLY)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 (VERY WELL)
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APPENDIX L
Experimental.Task
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 (Trials)
EXPERIMENT 1
This experiment studied people taking chances.

A group

of college students who were studying about business were asked
to play a game in which they made believe that they invested
money in real business.

The teacher kept track of how much

money the students would actually have made or lost by looking at the stock market page of the newspaper each day.
student started out with $2,000.00 of play money.
the students could buy or sell stocks.
months.

Each

Each day

The game lasted two

They were told that the three students that made

the most money would get A's in the course.

The students all

took tests and answered questions about themselves; how smart
they were, how much they liked themselves, how much they
liked other people, and how good a leader they were.

It was

discovered in this experiment that:
1.

People who take a lot of chances with money don't
1 i k e themselves very much.

2.

On rainy days the students usually lost money.

3.

The smartest students made the most money.

4.

No one ever made any money on Fridays.

5.

Students who said they didn't like other people
very much didn't take many chances with their money.

6.

The students who were the best leaders took the
biggest and most chances with their money.

7.

The students who lost all their money were poor
leaders.

~~-

~~-

~~-

~~-

~~-

~~-

~~-
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~~-

~~-

8.

The students who said they didn't like other people
very much usually put their money in a bank where
it would be safe but where they wouldn't make very
much.

9.

None of the students made any money.

10.

The three students who got A's in the course all said
they liked themselves very much.

EXPERIMENT 2
This experiment studied how and why people change their
attitudes or beliefs.

The person doing the experiment was

trying to find out what would be the best way to change people's
attitude toward dental care.

A group of 100 people were asked

a series of questions about how well they took care of their
teeth.

These questions gave information about how the people

brushed their teeth, used dental floss, went to the dentist,
and so forth.

Fifty of these people were shown a film which

tried to scare them into taking better care of their teeth by
showing pictures of rotten teeth, diseased gums, and dentists
pulling out teeth.

The other half of the people were shown a

film which merely explained how to take better care of your
teeth and showed examples of the proper way to brush and use
floss.

After one week and again after six months the people

were asked the same questions about how well they took care
of their teeth and how important they felt this was.

It was

discovered in this experiment that:
1.

~~-

People who saw the scary film changed their beliefs
more than the people who saw the film which just
gave explanations and examples.
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~~-

~~-

~~-

2.

Children under age 12 changed their attitudes more
than adults.

3.

People who saw the film which gave explanations and
examples said they had better dental habits at the
end of one week but were back to their same old
habits after six months.

4.

People who saw the scary film got worse in their
dental habits.

~~-5.

Adults over 21 years of age changed very little in
their beliefs.

~~-6.

Of the people who saw the scary film, the females
changed most.

7.

The people who saw the scary film reported better
dental habits after one week and had changed even
more so after six months.

8.

Most of the people went to the dentist within one week

9.

Most of the children under age 12 who saw the scary
film refused to go to the dentist afterwards.

~~-

~~-

~~-

10.

Most of the people said the films didn't affect them
one way or the other.

EXPERIMENT 3
This experiment studied different methods of teaching.
There were three ninth grade classes at three different schools
which took part.

.

Each class was taught by a different method .

In class A the teacher always told the students what to do
and how to do it.

In class B the teacher and the students

worked together to plan things.

In class C the students did

everything by themselves, the teacher only answered questions
or helped out when she was asked to.

At the end of one month

all of the classes took tests to see how much they had learned.
The students were also asked to rate on a ten point scale how

,-----
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much they liked school.

What was discovered in this experiment

was:

- - -1.
2.

There were more absences for students in class C.

---

Class A made the highest grades on the tests at the
end of the month.

- - -3.

The girls in all three classes said they liked school
more than the boys.

- - -4.

The students in class C did very well in History but
very poorly in Math.

- - - 5.

The students in class B liked school more than the
students in the other two classes.

- - -6.

The teacher in class C reported more fights and
behavior problems than the other two teachers.

7.

Class B had the poorest grades on the tests at the
end of the month.

8.
---

The students in class A liked school less than the
students in the other two classes.

- - -9.

The students in class C decided to play games and
didn't learn anything.

---

10.

There was little difference in the thr.ee classes on
the tests they took at the end of the month.

( 9 9. )

APPENDIX M
Informed Consent· Form
The purpose of this form is to help you understand what
will happen during this experiment. You are a volunteer and
may decide to stop and not take part at any time.
The goal of this experiment is to explore the factors
that students believe to be important in determining the
outcome of things that they do, for instance, whether they
are successful or not. The experiment will consist of two
sessions (approximately 45 minutes each) about two weeks apart.
You will be asked to fill out two questionnaires which ask you
to answer questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about
what you believe to· be important in bringing about the things
that happen to you, your successes and/or failures.
These
questions are not generally considered to be very personal in
nature. An example of this type of question is:
When you play a game and lose, do you lose*
(a)
because you just didn't play well, or
(b)
because the game was hard?
I will meet with you individually for the second session and
you will be asked to perform a simple task. This will consist
of reading brief summaries of a few experiments and trying to
pick out from a list what was actually discovered in the
experiment.
All of the information you give about yourself and how
you do on the task will be held in strict confidence. All
answer sheets and anything that may connect a given individual
with a questionnaire or task performance will be destroyed as
soon as the results have been tabulated. There will be a
time at the end of the experiment when you can ask any questions
you have about the experiment.
Your signature on this form means that you understand the
basic goals and procedures of this experiment and that you
volunteer to participate. You may decide to cease participation at any time, and you may ask that any of the information
you have given not be used.
It in no way means that you have
given up any of your legal rights.

Signed
Date
*Item #9. from the Stanford Preschool Internal-External Scale
(Mischel, Zeiss, and Zeiss, 1974).
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APPENDIX N
Debriefing
Some people think that how well they do or what happens
to them depends on their own abilities or talents.

Other

people think that luck or what the people around them do to
them is most important.
between.

And some people are kind of in

This experiment studied how these kinds of beliefs

might change.
Some of the students who took part in this experiment
were told that they could figure out the right answers on the
task, some were told they would have to depend on guess-work,
and some weren't told anything about what was important for
doing well.

Also, some of the students were told that they

did very well on the task, some that they did very poorly,
and some weren't told anything about how they did.

Actually,

the experiments were all made up and there were no real right
or wrong answers.
Please do not talk to anyone about this experiment until
after everyone has taken part.

If you do, it could make the

results false and your time would have been wasted.
Thank you very much for taking part in this experiment.
Your efforts are very valuable.
please ask them.

If you have any questions,

I will be happy to try to ahswer them.

Thank, you again.

(101.)

APPENDIX 0
Tables for Analysis of Locu·s of Control Scale
For Success-Failure Scores
TABLE 1:

Means and Standard Deviations
Pre Test
M
S.D.

Post Test
M
S.D.

Skill Instructions
Success feedback
Failure feedback
No feedback

25.333
22.833
28.333

3.882
2.317
4.719

25.5
29.5
27.667

1. 871
7.204
7.23

Chance Instructions
Success feedback
Failure feedback
No feedback

24.667
24.667
23.167

3.386
3.777
3.189

24.5
30
24

3.937
6.542
4.69

No Control Orientation
Success feedback
Failure feedback
No feedback

24.83
26.5
27.17

2.994
6.656
4.215

, 23
28.333
26.833

3.847
7.685
7.705

TABLE 2:

Summary of Instructions
SS

Source

2919.213
Total
1975.713
Between Subjects
19.685
Instructions
154.296
Feedback
124.315
I X F
1677.417
Error
943.5
Within suBjects
26.009
Trials
Trials x Instruc20.13
tions
Trials X feedback 188.741
31. 87
T X I X F
676.75
Error
w

*F

95, 4, 45

=

2~5875

df

x

Feedback X Trials Analysis
MS

F

p

107
53
2
2
4
45
54
1

9.843
77.148
31.079
37.276

<1
2.07
<l

N.S.
N.S.
N.S.

26.009

1. 729

N.S.

2
2
4
45

10.065
94.37
7.968
1.5. 0 39,

<:l
6.275*
<l

N.S.

<. 005
N.S.
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TABLE 3:
Source

SS

Groups
Trials
Trials X Groups
Error
(Total)
w
*F• 9 5 ,1, 4 5

Simple Effects, Trials by Groups
(Success Versus Failure)

=

144.5
40.5
174.222
676.75

df

1
45

MS

174.222
15.039

F

11.585*

p

<.005

4. 06

TABLE 4: Simple Effects, Trials by Groups
(Success Versus No Feedback)
Source

SS

Groups
Trials
Trials X Groups
Error
(Total)
w

76.056
12
11.389
676.75

df

1
45

MS

11. 389
15.039

F

<. 1

p

N.S.

TABLE 5: Simple Effects, Trials by Groups
(Failure Versus No Feedback)
Source

SS

Groups
Trials
Trials X Groups
Error
(Total)
w
*F95, 1 , 45

=

10.889
93.389
98
676.75

df

1
45

MS

98
15.039

F

6.516*

p

<.025

4.06

TABLE 6:
Source
Trials for Group 1
(success)
Errorw (Total)

Simple Effects, Trials by Group 1
(Success)
SS
23.361
676.75

df
1
45

.MS
23.361
15.039

F
1. 553

E
N.S.
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TABLE 7:
Source

Simple Effects, Trials by Group 2
(Failure)
SS

Trials for Group 2
(Failure)
Error
(Total)
w
*F95, 1, 45

=

Source

191.361
15.039

F
12.724*

p

<. 001

Simple.Effects, Trials by Groups 3
(No Feedback)
SS

Trials by Group 3
(No feedback)
(Total)
Error
w

.028
676.75

df
1
45

MS
.028
15.039

F

p

<1

N.S.

Simple Effects, Feedback Groups at Pre-Test

Source

SS

Total
Between Groups
Within Groups

TABLE 10:

1
45

MS

4.06

TABLE 8:

TABLE 9:

191.361
676.75

df

902.833
24.778
878.056

df
53
2
51

MS
12.389
17.217

F
<1

p
N.S.

Simple Effects, Feedback Groups at Post-Test

Source
---Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
*F 95, 2, 51 = 3.186

SS

df

1990.37
318.259
1672.111

53
2
51

MS
159.13
32.786

F
4.854*

p
<.OS

r--(10'1.)

TABLE 11:

Summary of Neuman-Keuls' Multiple-Range Test

Group 2 (Failure) Versus Group 3 (No Feedback)
c. diff .2 = 3.844
29.278 - 26.167

=

3.111 (not significant)

Group 3 (No Feedback) Versus Group 1 (Success)
c. diff .2 = 3.844
26.167 - 23.333

=

2.834 (not significant)

Group 1 (Success) Versus Group 2 (Failure)
c. diff.3 = 4.613
29.278 - 23.333

=

5.945 (significant)

,-------
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APPENDIX P
Tables for Analysis of IAR - Total I Score

TABLE 1:

Means and Standard Deviations
Pre-Test

Post-Test
S.D.
M

S.D.

M

Skill Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

24
26.167
25.167

2.53
2.858
3.545

27.667
26.667
25.667

2.582
4.131
3.386

Chance Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

24.667
26.167
26.5

4.502
1. 941
1. 517

26.167
26
27.333

3.545
4.195
3.141

No Control Orientation
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

26.667
24.833
27.167

2.944
3.125
1. 472

26.5
28.167
26.667

3.017
1. 4 72
4.502

TABLE 2:

Summary of Instructions X Feedback X Trials Analysis
SS

Source

1021.213
667.72
11. 358
4.581
16.237
635.583
353.493
30.09
10.271
9.049
35.507
268.577

Total
Between
Instructions
Feedback
I X F
ErrorB
Within
Trials
T X I
T X F
T X I x F
Errorw
*F95, 1, 45

=

4.06

df
107
53
2
2
4
45
54
1
2
2
4
45

MS

F

_P_

5.659
2.29
4.059
14.124

<1
<.l
<l

N.S.
N.S.
N.S.

30.09
5.136
4.524
8.877
5.968

5.042*
<1
<1
1.487

<. 05
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
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APPENDIX Q
Tables for Analysis of IAR TABLE 1:

I+ Subscale Scores

Means and Standard Deviations
M

Post-Test
SD
M

Pre-Test
SD

Skill Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

13.167
13.667
13

1. 329
1. 862
2.966

13.833
13.833
12.667

1. 722
1.722
2.733

Chance Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

12.667
14.333
13.17

2.582
.517
1. 472

12.833
13.833
13.33

2.137
1. 472
2.066

No Control Orientation
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

13.5
12.5
14.17

2,168
2.074
.983

13.5
14.33
14

2.811
1. 751
2

TABLE 2:

Summary of Instructions X Feedback x Trials Analysis

Source
'l1 otal

Between
Instructions
Feedback
I X F
Error
Withinb
Trials
T X I
T X F
T X I x F
Error
w

SS
396.852
260.852
2.241
4.796
14.648
239.167
136
1. 333
1. 722
1. 722
8.056
123.167

df
107
53
2
2
4
45
54
1
2
2
4
45

MS

1.12
2.398
3.662
5.315
1. 333
.861
.861
2.014
2.737

F

~l

<l
<. 1
<'.l
<l

<l

<1

p

N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.

I --------------------------------------------

- - --------

--

---
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APPENDIX R
Tables for Analysis of IAR - I

TABLE 1:

Subscale Scores

Means and Standard Deviations
Post-Test
SD
M

Pre-Test
M
SD
Skill Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

10.833
12.5
12.167

1. 472
1. 517
.983

13.833
12.833
13

1. 472

Chance Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

12
11. 333
13.33

2.098
1. 835
1.366

13.333
12.167
14

1.751
3.189
1.549

No Control Orientation
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

13 .17
12.33
13

1.329
2.338
1. 549

13
13.83
12.67

1.549
1.472
3.386

TABLE 2:

Summary of Analysis of IAR - I
SS

Source

421. 213
269.713
4.019
3.852
14.259
247.583
151.5
18.75
5.056
4.667
15.111
107.917

Total
Between
Instructions
Feedback
I X F
ErrorB
Within
Trials
T X I
T X F
T X I x F
Error
w
*F95, 1, 45

=

4.06

df
107
53
2
2
4
45
54
1
2
2
4
45

MS

2.009
1. 926
3.565
5.502
18.75
2.528
2.33
3.778
2.398

2.858
2.098

Subscale
F

_P_

<1

<l
<l
7.819*
1. 054
<1
1.575

<. 01
N.S.
N.S.

-------
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APPENDIX S
Tables for Analysis of Task Motivation
Question 1: How Important Is This Task to You?

TABLE 1:

Means and Standard Deviations
SD

M

Skill Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

4.833
4
5

Chance Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

5
5.167
4

No Control Orientation
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

5
4.667
4.333

TABLE 2:
Source
Total
Instructions
Feedback
I X F
Error

1. 835
1. 673

.632
1. 673
1. 472
1. 789
1. 414

1.211
2.161

Summary of Instructions X Feedback Analysis
SS
124
.111
2.333
7.222
114.333

df

MS

53
2
2
4
45

.056
1.167
1. 806
2.541

F
.022
.459
.711

_p_

N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
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APPENDIX T
Tables for Analysis of Task Motivation
Question 2:

How Important Is It That You Do Well On This Task?

TABLE 1:

Means and Standard Deviations
SD

M

Skill Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

5.167
4.333
6.5

1. 329
1. 751

Chance Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

4.5
5.667
4.667

1. 871
1. 862
1. 033

No Control Orientation
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

5
5.333
5.5

1. 897
1. 211

TABLE 2:
Source
Total
Instructions
Feedback
I X F
Error

.837

1.871

Summary of Instructions X Feedback Analysis
SS
128.148
1. 593
4.148
15.741
106.667

df

MS

F

_P_

53
2
2
4
45

.796
2.074
3.935
2.37

<1
<l
1.66

N.S.
N.S.
N.S.

,----

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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APPENDIX U
Tables for Analysis of Task Motivation
Question 3:

How Well Do You Think You Will Do On This Task?

TABLE 1:

Means and Standard Deviations
SD

M

Skill Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

4.5
4.333
5.667

.548
1. 033
1.033

Chance Instructions
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

4.333
4.5
3.833

.817
.837
.409

No Control Orientation
Success Feedback
Failure Feedback
No Feedback

4.667
4.833
4.833

.817
.753
.983

TABLE 2:
Source
Total
Instructions
Feedback
I X F
Error

Sununary of Instructions
SS

df

46.833
4.111
.778
7.111
34.833

53
2
2
4
45

x

MS
2.056
.389
1. 778
.774

Feedback Analysis
F

_£___

2.656
<: 1
2.297

N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
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